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INTRODUCTION 
 
This work aims to investigate the relationship between personal names and the 
evolution of natural language. My claim here is that personal names are signs that, when 
used vocally by humans, have very different characteristics than other linguistic 
elements, that necessarily precede the development of language, and that are intimately 
involved in the creation of circumstances contributing to that development. 
Accordingly, it will examine the appearance and behavior of personal names in 
various semiotic systems in order to understand their relationship with those systems as 
well as their role in the development of such systems. It will demonstrate that these 
signs both precede language and contribute significantly to the circumstances leading to 
its evolutionary development. 
The first part of this work will demonstrate that personal names occupy a unique 
position within human cultural and social systems, making them a strong candidate for 
investigation. It will then examine the behavior of names in linguistic environments, 
focusing on their semantic, syntactic, and semiotic characteristics. Here it will 
demonstrate that in many ways, personal names differ significantly from other elements 
of linguistic systems. 
In order to firmly establish the pre-linguistic origin of these signs, it will then 
explore naming behaviors in nonhuman animals—where, it will be shown, they occur 
abundantly—and propose certain frameworks through which naming behavior may be 
understood across the biological spectrum. Personal names will also be shown to 
correspond with specific organizations of social systems and interindividual relationship 
structures. 
Finally, the evolutionary consequences of these characteristics will be explored. 
Personal names will be linked to certain behavioral trends in various species in order to 
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establish patterns of behavioral influence which will then be considered in terms of the 
evolutionary conditions leading to the emergence of human language. 
 
Delineating the Object of Analysis 
 
 As this work is essentially concerned with determining the nature of these signs, 
it is perhaps premature to offer a fully functional definition at the outset. As a useful 
definition must encapsulate all significant aspects of an object that establish it as 
unique, this entire work will serve as a definition of sorts. Nevertheless, one cannot set 
about an investigation without first limiting the scope by offering some preliminary 
definition which will serve as a starting point. I will therefore define personal name—at 
least for now—as any non-deictic sign denoting a specific, singular individual, and 
serving as a sign of that individual’s unique identity. As this work will endeavor to 
examine naming behavior in humans as well as non-human animals, I do limit the 
notion of ‘individual’ to individual humans, but rather apply it to organisms of all 
species. 
Further examination in following sections will determine the extent to which the 
structure and use of human personal names corresponds with the structure and use of 
personal names in non-human animals. Of course, the definition proffered here relies on 
a steady definition of the organism itself, which is not easily provided, but it is my 
belief that an examination of the dynamics of names themselves might be useful in that 
task. 
 Thomas Sebeok (1994) describes names as a particular sign type worthy of 
mention equal to signals, symptoms, icons, indexes, and symbols. While he describes a 
name in general as “a sign which has an extensional class for its designatum” (Sebeok 
1994: 37), here I employ a more narrow definition, closer to what Sebeok terms a 
‘singular’ name, which “permits only one denotatum” (1994: 37). He also recognizes 
that names cannot be limited to the specific phonological realizations which would, in 
common parlance, be considered one’s ‘name’ (e.g. Veronica): 
Human individuals are identified by verbally attestable namors, say, a personal name or (In the 
United States since 1935) a unique social security registration number; and by a host of non-
verbal indicators, ‘the means by which a person, or dead body, may be definitely recognized, 
even in cases where the person purposely attempts to mislead’ (Wilder and Wentworth 1918: 
5).” (Sebeok 1994: 37) 
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While this is consistent with the definition used in this work, Sebeok’s first, wider 
definition is worthy of comment if only to avoid possible confusion. In accordance with 
the example supplied to demonstrate his ‘extensional class’ definition (i.e. Veronica), 
many personal names in many languages are shared by more than one individual—
indeed designating an extensional class. Collections of particular phonological 
realizations have, over time, come to be used as something of a lexicon of personal 
names within various language communities. As a result, it is not uncommon to 
encounter more than one person who apparently share the same name, especially in a 
modern world marked by larger communities, more communication, and greater 
globalization than ever before. 
 According to the definition employed within this work, however, these people 
do not in fact share a name, as a name—by this definition—cannot be shared, or else 
cannot properly be considered a name. These people do share a particular phonological 
manifestation that is commonly used as their name in vocal communication. In common 
social interaction, their name may be used, but there is never doubt as to which person 
that name refers to within that particular social context. If there is a social situation 
involving two individuals who usually use the same phonological realization to serve as 
their vocal name, one or both of the names will sometimes be altered in order to 
maintain clear reference. In these cases, the altered form takes on the properties of a 
name itself, and is treated as such even in syntactic determinations (Anderson 2007). 
The altered name remains stable in this social context, avoiding any deictic 
characteristics. 
 
Pre-Linguistic Signs 
 
 Explicitly stated in the title of this work is not only its intention to deal with 
personal names as an object of study, but also the particular argument offered herein: a 
claim that names are ‘pre-linguistic signs’. The nature of names as semiotic entities 
should be quite obvious, and in fact they are defined by their semiotic characteristics as 
such. In characterizing names as ‘pre-linguistic’, I argue that names are not of the same 
evolutionary origin as linguistic systems, but rather precede them both structurally and 
evolutionarily. 
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What is also contained herein is evidence that names are less linguistically and 
semiotically developed than other elements of language, both in terms of modes of 
reference and of use, and furthermore, that they must be. That is, these qualities are 
determined by their very nature as names. These unique semiotic entities are traced 
back to their pre-linguistic roots—pre-linguistic in terms of historical appearance and 
the nature of their development. The essential expression of names—that of individual 
identity—is examined in terms of the forms and consequences of its appearance in non-
human animals as well as the evolutionary pressures that would determine such 
behavior. 
 
Notes on Human vs. Animal Semiotic Activity 
 
Due to the nature of the specific claim being investigated in this work, the 
‘boundaries’ between semiotic activity among humans and non-human animals will be a 
major focus.1 Predictably, there are various philosophical and ideological issues that 
accompany such a comparison. For thousands of years, linguistic ability has been the 
determining characteristic of humanity. Drawing parallels between this bastion of 
human ‘reason’ and the ‘illogical’ realm of beasts was unthinkable. While most scholars 
today are willing to accept that humans are biological kin to our animal neighbors, 
linguistic ability is still often considered a far cry from any animal communication—
and for good reason. There are many scholars—Thomas Sebeok among them—who 
would balk at any comparison of language and animal communication, claiming that 
their essential natures are so different that any comparison would be fruitless and 
methodologically flawed. 
As previously stated, this work intends to draw parallels between name use in 
humans and non-human animals. While this would seem to contravene the warnings of 
Sebeok and his cohorts, I believe the claim that names resist full participation in 
linguistic systems allows these parallels to be drawn without clarifying the status of the 
relationship as it applies to language in general. Since I intend to show that names are of 
a different origin than language, I feel no obligation to restrict myself to limits placed 
on the investigation of linguistic systems in general.  
                                                
1 That is, if these boundaries are claimed to exist, the extent of which is a matter of debate encompassing 
a multitude of data from many fields. 
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Historiography 
 
 The history of the investigation of personal names by numerous scholars in 
various fields is largely limited to personal names as they apply to humans, and is much 
too long and complex to be covered here in full. It would take many volumes to provide 
a truly satisfactory account. Care must also be taken here to avoid confusion of the 
terms that are often translated into Modern English as ‘name’. The study of names far 
precedes the current form of this language, and terms in other languages that are 
translated as ‘name’ often encompass a great deal more, such as ‘noun’ or ‘word’ in 
general. That English provides these different terms as a built-in mechanism for 
distinguishing between these concepts is a blessing for this work, but care should be 
taken in considering sources in other languages that make no such distinction at a 
lexical level. 
 In fact, a history of the study of personal names is complicated not only by the 
frequent lack of terminological distinction, but also by a lack of ontological distinction. 
Therefore, a history of personal names, as they have been treated up to this point, is 
often simply a history of the study of language in general. This is decidedly different 
from the approach taken in this paper, which intends to examine names as distinct 
entities sometimes embedded in—but essentially separate from—linguistic systems. In 
pursuing this task, I will consider perspectives from many different disciplines, and so 
will provide historical information on these fields where applicable (e.g. when 
considering the various historical traditions accounting for the semantics of proper 
names). Since the approach here is so multidisciplinary in nature, it makes the most 
sense to address any relevant historical approaches within the sections to which they 
relate. 
 There are some general approaches that have been taken in the past towards the 
study of human personal names, perhaps the most prominent among them being 
onomastics, the philosophy of language, and linguistics. 
 Onomastics is generally concerned with the particular manifestations of names 
and how they came to take the form they did. Main research areas include the 
etymology of names, various systems by which they are created, and the use of various 
forms. As this work is not at all concerned with the specific manifestation of personal 
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names (as is explained in the section covering methodology), onomastics has little 
relevance for this project. 
 The philosophy of language has offered numerous viewpoints on both the origin 
and meaning of names, the most relevant of which are covered in subsequent sections. 
There is not an extensive history of linguistic approaches to the study of names, 
and this approach also proves to not be very useful for this project, as personal names 
alone are rarely the object of analysis. 
 Perhaps the approach most relevant to this project is the examination of the 
presence of names in nonhuman animal species, which also proves to be fairly recent 
and quite underdeveloped. The genesis of this approach is frequently identified as 
Sebeok: 
Next year, there appeared a fascinating and amply circumstantiated study by Hediger, on “Proper 
Names in the Animal Kingdom,” in which the great animal psychologist remarked that “The 
word proper name (propri nomi) for animals was probably first used by Sebeok” (1976:1360). 
(Sebeok 1986: 82) 
 
So any consideration of the use of personal names in nonhuman animals is a fairly new 
field of research, the full potential of which is certainly yet to be realized. Hopefully, 
this project can offer a small contribution to this ongoing endeavor. 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
 This work will deal with names as a particular signform, examining their 
structure and function within various semiotic systems. It will be concerned with the 
nature of names in general, and will not will not be concerned with the particular 
manifestation of proper names (i.e. their etymology, frequency, etc.), except where the 
consideration of such would shed light on their general nature. It will not address the 
multifarious naming systems at play in different human cultures except to comment that 
they function according to the social standing of the holder of the particular name, be 
that standing effected by genetic relations or cultural constructions. 
I will consider various data from accounts of naming behavior in both humans 
and non-human animals collected by linguists, biologists, anthropologists, and others in 
order to provide a theory of names as a unique sign system. I will examine phenomena 
they arise from and give rise to, with particular focus on linguistic and evolutionary 
implications. My primary viewpoint will be a linguistic one, but that cannot ignore the 
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contributions of other fields in order to form any kind of adequate analysis. An account 
of naming behaviors in non-human animals will be of particular importance here, 
especially given the nature of the object in question, which I will argue is not linguistic 
in nature, but rather appears in various forms across the biological spectrum. 
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1. PERSONAL NAMES IN HUMAN SEMIOTIC SYSTEMS 
 
This section will examine the behavior of names in human semiotic systems. 
Within this section, unless otherwise noted, the term personal name is used in a more 
limited way than defined above. Here it will be used to indicate the semiotic entities 
which we most commonly associate with names—that is, the particular signs that we 
actively and consciously use to indicate ourselves. While I sometimes employ the term 
human vocal name to designate this category, I do not mean to limit their form to 
instances of vocalization, although a vocal manifestation is probably the oldest and most 
common expression. Thus I include other forms such as written and sign names (in deaf 
communities), to which the same observations typically apply. 
It is not difficult to determine that personal names permeate our semiotic 
experience. They are an essential element of many social interactions, are commonly 
used in linguistic contexts, and have taken on a special cultural significance. They are 
the ultimate extension of human identity. Knowing someone includes knowing their 
name, and a name is often the first information offered upon meeting a stranger. 
This has become particularly important in the modern world, as increasing 
globalism and a growing population means we are living in much larger communities, 
interacting with many more people than ever before, and communicating with people 
over enormous distances. More and more we are known to others by our name alone. 
 
1.0.1. Notes on the Universality of Human Vocal Names 
 
Human personal names are generally considered to be universal. This is often seen as so 
essential to human behavior that comment is unnecessary. However, there seems to be 
very few documented cases of groups of people lacking personal names, although the 
circumstances here are rather unclear. 
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The most specific account of a people apparently without names comes in the 
form of a thesis written based on fieldwork done with the Machiguenga2 tribe of the 
Amazon in 1952: 
Each individual mentioned was described as either the relative of the speaker or the relative of 
some other individual referred to either by a kin term or by a descriptive phrase such as ‘the one 
who came yesterday’, etc. We learned that we had to know exactly how each person was related 
to every other person, not only in the immediate group but also in the other groups with which 
contact was maintained, if we were going to be able to actively participate in the conversations. 
At the same time, we endeavored to elicit the names of various individuals. The usual response 
we received was tera nompaitempa ‘I’m not named’, mameri nobairo ‘my name doesn’t exist’, 
or tera ‘no’. This led us to wonder if they were deliberately withholding their names from us as 
outsiders, if perhaps the use of personal names was taboo, or is they actually did not have names. 
(Snell 1964: 18-19) 
 
This is a very unusual discovery, and even Snell admits that “We had never heard of a 
group of people where individuals were not given personal names” (1964: 19). 
It is interesting to note that the replacements used in the supposed absence of 
personal names involved recourse to description or deixis, which involves a form of 
reference significantly deviates from that of names. 
The veracity of the author’s claim that personal names were entirely absent in 
the Machiguenga is unclear. There is a strong possibility here that names were avoided 
due to strong taboos, which are not uncommon when dealing with naming behaviors, as 
is discussed in subsequent sections of this work. Snell himself suspects this (as 
evidenced by the above statement), and mentions that among the Piro, a tribe of the 
same cultural group as the Machiguenga and residing nearby, “The use of names is 
generally avoided” (Matteson 1954, qtd. in Snell 1964: 19). While the wording here 
seems to indicate a mere preference on the part of the Piro, the consequences of 
breaking name taboos can be serious: 
One of our colleagues who was working with the Amarakeri had alerted us to the possibility that 
the attempt to elicit names could have serious repercussions. His own life had been threatened 
when he unthinkingly played a tape for the Indians on which there were names of deceased 
Amarakeri relatives and companions. (Snell 1964: 19) 
 
Although the Machiguenga did not seem to provide names for themselves, the author 
notes that “many Machiguenga had been given Spanish names by outsiders” (Snell 
1964: 20), but also that “Even when the name was well known by all members of the 
immediate group they would not use it among themselves and would use it when talking 
to us only after having exhausted every other means they could think of in trying to 
                                                
2 The name of the tribe, given here and in the aforementioned work as ‘Machiguenga’, seems to appear in 
a variety of different spellings. Within this work I will consistently use the variation above, as this is the 
form used in the work which has the most relevance for this paper. 
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make us understand about whom they were talking” (Snell 1964: 20). Note here that 
names serve as an important recourse in the process of referring to an individual. 
 In addition to these Spanish names, Snell makes an interesting comment that 
hints at some kind of pseudo-naming behavior, the nature of which was never made 
clear and seems to not have been fully investigated: “Later on in the course of our 
investigations, we discovered that individuals were referred to by terms which were 
neither kin terms nor Spanish derivatives” (Snell 1964: 21). It is not clear what these 
terms are, nor when they were used. While they seem to possess many of the features of 
personal names, more data is needed to determine their exact nature and function within 
Machiguenga society. 
That these ‘names’ were not apparent to the author as names seems to be due to 
the fact that, as the author discovered, people almost never divulged their own 
appellations; a more fruitful method of inquiry was elicitation from friends and relatives 
of the individual in question (Snell 1964: 21). Only a minority of the Machiguenga had 
these ‘pseudo-names’, however, so the claim that a universal naming practice was 
absent in the tribe is still tenable considering this evidence. 
 It is interesting to note that the establishment of bilingual schools among the 
Machiguenga by the Peruvian government forced the registration of each individual and 
the imposition of personal names—including surnames (Snell 1964: 23). This hearkens 
back to Sebeok’s (1994: 37) characterization of state-imposed individual labels, such as 
personal registration numbers, as a form of name regardless of the form they take. 
 Nevertheless, neither names imposed by outsiders nor the mysterious ‘pseudo-
names’ that originate with the Machiguenga themselves are applied to all individuals, 
and Snell notes that “We have known Machiguenga Indians who reached adulthood and 
died without ever having received a name or any other designation outside of the 
kinship system.” (Snell 1964: 24) 
 It is important to note that while the kinship terms used to indicate individuals 
among the Machiguenga do indicate a specific, singular individual, when they are used, 
they are deictic in nature, and therefore cannot be considered examples of personal 
names. The fact that the same kinship terms are presumably used by different members 
of Machiguenga society to indicate different people (and that the correct referent of 
those terms differs depending on the context of their utterance), clearly indicates that 
they are very different from personal names in their referential nature. The proper 
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referent of a personal names cannot and does not depend on context. It is this property 
of names that determines their unique status differing from all other vocal utterances. 
Perhaps relevant in accounting for this rare phenomenon, if the phenomenon 
itself indeed exists, is Snell’s proposed explanation: “Living in small isolated groups 
there is no imperative need for them to designate each other in any other way than by 
kinship terminology” (1964: 25). That particular social circumstances or environments 
can lead to certain naming behavior that is deviant from an apparent norm is an 
interesting concept that will be explored further in some following sections.3 
 
1.1. Cultural and Social Systems 
 
As I intend to argue for a special place for names in linguistic systems, it is 
reasonable to expect that names also occupy a special place in cultural and social 
systems. According to the cultural semiotic paradigm of the Tartu-Moscow Semiotic 
School, culture is classified as a secondary modeling system built on language as the 
primary modeling system. Therefore, if names occupy a unique role in linguistic 
systems, one would expect that to be reflected in cultural systems, and an examination 
of names in that context will be required. 
In the tradition of cultural semiotics, Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenski dedicate a 
well-known and oft-cited work to the role of names in their model of cultural 
consciousness (Lotman & Uspenski 1978). Therein, they identify names as belonging to 
a certain division of culture that is referred to as ‘mythical’. This particular division is 
opposed to the ‘historical’ cultural consciousness, which is predominant in our usual 
modern understanding of the world. They examine the nature of these two models and 
the behavior of various semiotic systems within them, and conclude that 
The behavior of proper names in a number of linguistic situations is so different from the 
corresponding behavior of other linguistic categories that it involuntarily suggests the idea that 
before us, incorporated into the body of natural language, is some other, differently structured 
language. (Lotman & Uspenski 1978: 215) 
 
I claim a similar conclusion in this work, albeit from a different perspective and 
examining different data. Their conclusion here is relevant, however, in that it 
                                                
3 This mirrors some controversial claims about the Pirahã language made by the linguist Daniel Everett. 
He has claimed that Pirahã lacks many features that are often considered universal and essential to human 
language. He proffers a theory that language, as a cultural tool, is highly adaptable to cultural needs. The 
Pirahã, having no need to express several concepts, lack the ability to do so. (Everett 2005, 2008, 2012) 
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demonstrates that the recognition of names as semiotic entities that defy linguistic 
categorization is pervasive at all operational levels. 
 
1.1.1. Kinship and Individuality 
 
The study of kinship terms has long been a popular pursuit among 
anthropologists, whose work is based on the assumption that particular modes of 
labeling certain individuals reflects a certain social organization. I intend to show the 
same for personal names, although that will require comparison with social 
organizations based on an absolute lack of personal names—something only observed 
in certain species of nonhuman animals. 
Clearly, a system of personal names is quite different from a system of kinship 
terms—most clearly because the former has none of the deictic character of the latter. 
Also, categories of kinship are just that—categories—whereas personal names reflect a 
completely different social reality.4 
While kinship terms typically demonstrate traits of familial organization, the 
possession of a personal name identifies the individual as an individual, not part of 
some kin-oriented category. So while kinship terms determine a person’s place within a 
social subgroup, a name establishes a person as an individual and provides the basis for 
their operation as a social actor. Without a name, the individual is not only unable to 
participate in the kinship groups expressed by kin terms, but also is unable to participate 
in any aspect of sociality at all. Social interaction is entirely dependent upon the social 
agency conferred by such a name. Without kinship relations, an individual is, in theory, 
still able to participate in human social systems, but that participation itself already 
assumes the existence of a personal name (in some form) for that individual. 
Quite recently, certain indications of kinship have been added onto personal 
names. The particular forms this takes and the various systems producing them are not 
my concern in this work. The fact that an indication of kin affiliation has been placed 
with personal names, however, reflect the close relationship between both of these 
systems and the social organization of a group of people. 
                                                
4 For these reasons, the use of kinship terms among the Machiguenga is not at all equivalent to the use of 
personal names. 
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The most common manifestation of this is found in the surname, typically 
passed from parent to child according to some particular system determining such a 
conferment. It is interesting to note that the original form of many of these surnames 
convey a certain social standing or certain social role, which accentuates the strong 
connection of names with sociality. However, the name in this form is not a proper 
personal name, for it does not refer to an individual, but rather to a larger, less specific 
social determination. Unsurprisingly, surnames do not possess the same semantic and 
syntactic characteristics of proper personal names. 
It is important to note that within certain social interactions, the phonological 
realization of the surname becomes an individual’s personal name. For example, it is 
not uncommon in certain professional environments for people to refer to one another 
using their surnames alone. In this case, the surname clearly becomes a personal name 
in its function, and adopts all of the particular characteristics of that signform. While 
this particular form of the individual’s personal name may not be the one determined by 
law or tradition, it is established as a personal name by use as such, which, in turn, 
determines its semantic and syntactic properties. 
 
1.1.2. Naming Taboos 
 
 Taboos, or the culturally determined regular and powerful avoidance of certain 
actions, are a good indication of the elements that have increased importance in cultural 
systems. Adhering to taboos can be quite inconvenient, but the cultural values 
determining such practices are considered so important that the violation of a taboo can 
hold serious consequences. The avoided behaviors prohibited by such taboos can 
therefore be identified as culturally significant. 
Taboos on particular instances of name use are among the most common taboos 
found in cultures all over the world: 
Name avoidance practices are among the most frequently mentioned sociological phenomena in 
world ethnography because they are cross-culturally widespread and are a focus of strong 
reflexive interest on the part of people who practice them. (Stasch 2011: 102) 
 
These taboos are so widespread and are governed by so many different rules and 
formulas that a complete description of all behaviors and practices cannot be 
accomplished here. Therefore, I endeavor to provide some idea of the wide range of 
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these taboos and the underlying cultural determinations present in the communities in 
which they are observed: 
The tabooing of personal names is a frequent and rather salient phenomenon, showing up time 
and again in ethnographic descriptions. Taboos on saying the names of various categories of 
affinal kin are the most widespread, being very common in Melanesia (see Simons 1982 for a 
survey), Australia (e.g., Thomson 1946 on Wik Monkan), as well as diverse parts of Africa (e.g., 
Irvine 1998 on Zulu, Treis 2005 of Kambaata, Mbaya 2002 on Oromo). In much of South Asia, 
it is normatively expected that women shouldn’t utter their husband’s name (e.g., Trawick 
1996:95 on Tamil). In the Americas, taboos on uttering the names of the dead are probably those 
which are the most elaborated (e.g., Elmendorf 1951 on Twana). Taboos on naming a big-man, 
chief, or king are also widely reported (e.g., Raum 1973 on Zulu, Frazer 1958 on Maori). 
(Fleming 2011: 142) 
 
The majority of name taboos occur in relation to the death of particular individuals, and 
one of the most common taboos associated with the use of personal names prohibit the 
naming of the dead. This is quite a widespread taboo, found in various tribal societies 
from Australia to North America (Frazer 1922). This prohibition may be permanent or 
temporary, and may apply to only certain groups within the larger community (e.g. the 
close family of the deceased) (Frazer 1922, 1990). McGrath and Phillips, observing 
name avoidance taboos in different Australian Aboriginal tribes, note various different 
practices: 
Sometimes immediate family doesn’t use the name, sometimes it is not used for a few years, 
sometimes it is never used again for that person but a child is named the same name a few years 
later. (McGrath & Phillips 2008: 64) 
 
Some participants indicated that the deceased’s name should never be mentioned again, although 
others reported that the deceased’s name need only be omitted from mention for a short period of 
time. (McGrath & Phillips 2008: 64) 
 
Some taboos associated with the dead also affect the form and use of names indicating 
individuals who are still alive. For example, the Tuaregs, a nomadic Berber people 
living in the Sahara, avoid the Arab tradition of adding to one’s name the names of the 
individual’s patrilineal ancestors since the names of those who are deceased cannot be 
uttered again (Frazer 1922). In some Australian Aboriginal tribes found near Adelaide 
and Encounter Bay, those who share a name with someone who is recently deceased 
abondon that name and adopt another (Frazer 1922). These are not uncommon 
practices, and the extent to which the names of the living are manipulated in the face of 
a death is extremely variable. Perhaps the most interesting case can be found in the 
Mbayá, an indigenous group of Paraguay. On the occasion of a death within a Mbayá 
tribe, the names of every living member of that tribe are taboo and are replaced by the 
chief, so that the name of a living individual changes whenever anyone dies (Frazer 
1990). 
18 
These prohibitions will also sometimes apply to other words in the language that 
are phonetically similar to the name, with the result that certain words in these 
languages may be replaced permanently with a borrowed word from a neighboring 
language: 
The Abiponian language [the Abipones were a tribe of South American Indians, now extinct] is 
involved in new difficulties by a ridiculous custom which the savages have of continually 
abolishing words common to the whole nation, and substituting new ones in their stead. Funeral 
rites are the origin of this custom. The Abipones do not like that anything should remain to 
remind them of the dead. Hence appellative words bearing any affinity with the name of the 
deceased are presently abolished. (Jesuit missionary Dobrizhoffer, qtd. in Tylor, qtd. in Scott 
1912: 361-362) 
 
This process is sometimes so widespread that some linguists suggest that comparative 
reconstruction of these languages is nearly impossible due to the large degree of lexical 
replacement (Dixon 2002). The avoidance of homophones and near-homophones is 
perhaps an expression of a particularly strong taboo that leads not only to the avoidance 
of those words which refer to the particular person, but also any words that bear an 
iconic resemblance to those words: 
Within the Peircean framework of type/token relations (Peirce and Welby 1977) we would say 
that this represents a movement from avoiding all tokens of the taboo type to a broader 
avoidance, of all tones (or ‘marks’) of tokens of the taboo type […]. That is, the material 
substance of the sign, whether phonetic, graphic, or gestural, need only be (taken to be) iconic 
with tokens of the taboo type for them to be avoided. (Fleming 2011: 155) 
 
The motivation behind name avoidance taboos related to the deceased seems to be 
primarily a concern that the utterance of the name will call the deceased back to the land 
of the living, a place where he or she should not be (McGrath & Phillips 2008). 
Of course, name avoidance taboos are not wholly limited to the arena of death, 
and may form an important part of the normal social activities of a community. The 
rules governing these forms of the taboo also take on a variety of forms. 
A man will not utter his own name; husband and wife will not utter one another’s names; the 
son- or daughter-in-law will not mention the name of the father- or mother-in-law, and vice 
versa; the names of chiefs may not be uttered, nor the names of certain other persons, nor of 
superhuman beings, nor of animals and things to which supernatural powers are ascribed. (Tylor 
(Early History of Mankind) qtd. in Scott 1912: 361) 
 
When examining the particular cultural dynamics governing name taboo behavior, 
Fleming (2011) attributes the underlying cause of these taboos to the particular semiotic 
structure of names themselves: 
I argue that the referential indexical function of personal names, characterized by the unique 
manner in which personal names pick out the same referent across all occasions of use, serves as 
a model and motivation for the elaboration of the nonreferential functions of name taboos (i.e., 
their ability to cause offense, harm, shame, etc.). (Fleming 2011: 143) 
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Personal names are social indexicals, the indexical connection having been forged in a baptismal 
event. The successful use of a personal name presupposes that both speaker and addressee have 
been socialized to this name-referent connection. They are links in a speech-chain which 
connects that initial baptismal event to the present instance of referring. (Fleming 2001: 145) 
 
Kin-terms are semiotically motivated to serve as more deferential address forms precisely 
because, being true symbols, they are not, in their default usage, inherently referential. (Fleming 
2011: 145) 
 
In the work of Stasch (2011), this characteristic of names is shown to be the motivation 
behind name avoidance taboos in the Korowai of New Guinea, who replace names with 
“kinship terms and kinship-based expressions emphasizing people’s location in social 
bonds” (Stasch 2011: 114). As such, the avoidance of personal names serves to 
highlight the deictic nature of the kinship terms that are used in their stead, emphasizing 
the relationship between in-laws: 
This paradoxical logic of indexically creating relatedness by non-relating not only sharpens 
bonds that already exist, but also creates relations in the first place, or creatively redefines them. 
(Stasch 2011: 106) 
 
In these cases, an avoiding speaker indexically carries the interactional presence of a relational 
other everywhere, much in the same way that a wedding ring in certain societies works 
indexically and iconically to make a spousal relation part of a person’s bodily presence in all 
times and places, even when the spouses are not themselves together. (Stasch 2011: 107) 
 
Here, the use of deictic terms instead of names serves as a form of extended cognition, 
offloading the relationships between people onto particular forms of individual 
reference. The use of deictics emphasizes that the speaker and the referent have a 
certain location in the social matrix relative to each other. The fact that this deictic 
replacement of names frequently appears in the context of reference to in-laws is telling, 
as an in-law relationship is more closely defined by a constructed sociocultural contract 
rather than genetic relatedness. 
Stasch (2011) also observes that, among the Korowai, the violation of name 
avoidance taboos is just as meaningful as the avoidance taboo itself, and serves as an 
attack on the relationship between the referent and the utterer. If a name—that which 
directly and non-deictically refers to a certain individual—is used instead of the 
replacement kin term—which refers deictically—the utterer can express that the 
relationship establishing the deictic reference is being insufficiently maintained.  
Korowai purposefully transgress avoidance norms often, and with rich expressive motives and 
effects. For instance, a married man’s in-laws will sometimes take to saying his name 
deliberately among themselves as a way of expressing discontent with him for failing to visit 
them and help with house-building or garden clearing, or failing in other ways to enact an 
appropriate sense of ‘abiding obligation’ (Merlan 1997). The maligned man is likely to hear 
secondhand about the name uttering. He might take it as a provocation to improve his actions, or 
the transgression might become a further step in the deterioration of in-law relations into open 
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disparagement. Mothers-in-law are sometimes known to deliberately sneak a glance at sons-in-
law who have not been giving appropriate bridewealth as a performative statement that the 
mother-in-law relation does not really exist. The mortified son-in-law is likely to improve his 
gift-giving, when he hears about the violation. (Stasch 2011: 110) 
 
Not only does a violation of the taboo indicate a deterioration of constructed kinship 
relations, but also may do physical harm to the person whose name has been uttered 
inappropriately (Stasch 2011). Due to the “referential indexical” nature of the name, it is 
often interpreted as having a direct physical effect on its referent: 
The ‘timeless’ indexical relation between form and referent models and motivates a similarly 
immutable performative relation between form and referent which, in cases of taboos, must be 
avoided. There is a strong semiotic functional motivation for the inherent and invariant indexical 
relation between form and referent to be re-analyzed as a causal and performative one. Indeed, in 
cases of name taboos, the referential indexical function of the noun-phrase type serves as a 
ground, and site of semiotic exaptation, for a nonreferential performative function which, in 
some cases, all but supplants it. (Fleming 2011: 151) 
 
Words Korowai avoid are experienced as particularly troubled and troubling studies in linguistic 
signifiers’ capacity of ‘making present’ absent signifieds. Lexical avoidances at large are part of 
a broader family of problems in the morality of representations. In different cultural and 
historical settings, and focused on different semiotic media, people experience a seemingly 
separate referent as being ‘there’ in the representation itself, not just semantically but 
ontologically, such that the representation is felt to have powerful effects on the referent or on 
the representation’s producers and audiences. Korowai lexical avoidances often involve a form-
fetishistic notion that there is a direct, non-semantic path from the physicality of a phonological 
signifier to the physical being of its referent. (Stasch 2011: 112) 
 
This not only accounts for the avoidance of names in instances of living persons, but 
also of the deceased. If names have such a strong connection to their referents—strong 
enough to have physical effects on those referents—then uttering the name of the 
deceased could have some very unfortunate consequences that should be avoided. The 
dead should remain in the region of the dead, and if there is some task they must 
undertake to achieve rest, their ability to complete such a task should not be hindered. 
It seems that these name avoidance taboos are not only indications of the 
importance of names in cultural systems, but also the unique place of personal names 
within linguistic systems. The nature of personal names seems to differ drastically from 
all other language, and these special indexes are seen to establish a much stronger 
connection with that to which they refer. Personal names in this context are “one special 
area of interface and overlap between a linguistic sign system and the more broadly 
constituted actors who use that system” (Stasch 2011: 114). 
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1.1.3. Reflection of Social Status 
 
It is no surprise that names often reflect the social status of their holders. An 
interesting consequence of this is that when acts of naming become ritualized—and this 
is a very common occurrence given the importance of personal names and the need to 
consolidate naming behavior in order to safeguard social structures—they occur during 
rituals which confer a different social status upon their participants. Consider four major 
ritual events that conform to this pattern: birth, coming of age/initiation, marriage, and 
death. 
Birth represents the first entrance of an individual into the social system. Since 
existence is a prerequisite of sociality, and humans live in social groups, the biological 
event of birth is expected to represent a significant social event for the individual. This 
is supported by various naming events associated with birth, which may even be 
accompanied by a separate naming ceremony (as in various religious communities such 
as the Jewish Brit milah or the Catholic sacrament of Baptism).5 That a conferment of a 
name occurs in conjunction with birth is so common that further demonstration is 
utterly unnecessary. 
The ritual event known as ‘coming of age’ often represents the next major 
change in social status. It is common for cultures to make a distinction between children 
and adults, and the transition from the former category to the latter is often marked 
ritually. Another variant of this transition is initiation into some exclusive group or 
organization. In this case, the ritual marks a transition from a state of uninitiated/non-
membership to a state of initiated/membership. This ritual often involves the 
abandonment of a childhood/uninitiated name and the adoption of a new name 
accompanying this new status. Once again, remnants of these rituals in modern Western 
society are found in various religious ceremonies in which special names are chosen 
(e.g. Bar/Bat Mitzvah and the Catholic sacrament of Confirmation). 
Marriage has the same basic structure as coming of age/initiation, but represents 
a symbolic alteration/manipulation of genetic association. Marriage is the sociocultural 
construction of a relation that carries greater importance than any genetic relation that 
                                                
5 A possible exception, of course, being the Machiguenga (Snell 1964). However, the author implicitly 
recognizes the relevance of these events in terms of names when he states in a footnote: “We have been 
invited to witness rites performed at birth, girl’s puberty, marriage, death, and burial. We are convinced 
that neither names nor any other designations have any part in these ceremonies.” (Snell 1964: 21) 
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may exist.6 As such, the name changes associated with marriage often involve aspects 
of the name that indicate membership in a particular genetic class (e.g. surnames) in 
order to culturally classify the relation as genetic even when one does not exist. 
Death provides some of the most interesting manipulation of names, some of 
which are discussed in the preceding section on name avoidance taboos. Upon the death 
of an individual, a disruption suddenly appears in the social network of a group due to 
the absence of a formerly present element. A name, which once referred to a specific 
person, now refers to nothing at all, or at least nothing that can be accessed by the 
living. As a result, death causes a wide variety of name manipulation, many of which 
are discussed in detail above. 
 
1.2. Personal Names in Linguistic Systems 
 
 In order to provide a full account of the nature of names in human semiotic 
systems, it is necessary to examine them in the context in which they most obviously 
occur for the human species—that of language. In order to properly accomplish this, I 
will make use of tools from descriptive linguistic analysis, the philosophy of language, 
and researchers into the specific semiotic characteristics that define human language in 
relation to nonhuman animal communication. Particular attention will be paid to 
semantic and syntactic systems, since these most clearly determine the state of names in 
language in regards to other elements. In these linguistic subsystems, the deviant nature 
of names is most evident. 
 While approaching names as elements of a linguistic system seems to contradict 
the aim of this work, in this section I do not claim to represent and examine names as a 
part of linguistic systems, but rather examine their behavior when placed in a linguistic 
context. My goal is to show that when placed in this context, names behave very 
differently than other linguistic elements. This is intended to not only support the claim 
that names are essentially pre-linguistic, but also shed light on some properties of names 
that will become important when considering their place in various semiotic typologies. 
 While personal names seem to resist the full participation in linguistic systems 
that is typical of other referential vocal utterances, they must conform to certain 
                                                
6 Various taboos against marriage to close familial relations (parents, siblings, etc.) guarantee this. 
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restraints in order to be expressed in a linguistic context—constraints imposed by the 
language itself. The strongest constraints seem to be phonological, perhaps due to the 
fact that while syntactic and semantic properties are often semi-consciously flexible, 
phonological systems are clearly hardwired and alter the very perception of sounds 
themselves (e.g. categorical perception of phonemes). Consequently, human vocal 
names will often have phonological properties that are indistinguishable from other 
linguistic elements, while this is far from true for other linguistic characteristics. 
 An issue for examining personal names in a linguistic context is that they are 
sometimes difficult to distinguish from proper nouns—nouns that indicate not to a 
general category, but rather a specific referent. Certainly these signs are related in that 
they have similar referential qualities and similar syntactic properties, but they are not 
identical, and some differences do appear. 
 
1.2.1. Syntactic Properties of Personal Names 
 
The behavior of names in syntactic systems is essentially a question of lexical 
class (also known as lexical category, grammatical category, word class, part of 
speech). Lexical classes provide linguists with a model for classifying words in a 
particular language in order to reliably predict their behavior in morphosyntactic 
environments. Names are often a challenge to classify in this way, as they display 
unusual characteristics in these environments that render these predictions unreliable. 
These lexical categories are particularly useful in providing the basis for 
modeling the structure of phrases in phrase structure grammars, which have been central 
to the most popular grammatical theories for hundreds of years. Accordingly, this 
section will make extensive use of phrase structures to demonstrate that names 
constitute their own lexical class—one that differs from every other lexical class in 
terms of syntactic function. 
As phrase structure grammars can get quite complicated and become very 
diverse at their more developed stages, I will necessarily be employing a very simplified 
model. This will meet the needs of the observations examined within this section—as 
the unique characteristics of names are evident even in very simplified grammars—
without confusing the analysis with unnecessary detail and complexity. 
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The determination of a particular word’s lexical class depends upon its relations 
within the sentence structure, so that even words with identitical phonological 
realizations can serve different roles within the sentence and therefore belong to 
separate lexical classes. For example, the English word jump may act as a verb 
indicating a certain bodily action, or it may serve as a noun indicating a particular 
instance of this action (either physically or metaphorically) or even a physical device 
aiding in the performance of that action. Clearly, the two uses are quite similar in their 
meaning and both can be used to refer to the same event with the same participants, as 
demonstrated in sentences (a) and (b) below: 
(a) George and Mary jump over the stream. 
(b) George and Mary make a jump over the stream. 
These two sentences express the same action carried out by the same participants, but 
jump in the two sentences represents two very different uses of the same word. While in 
both sentences the referent is very similar, the syntactic role of the two words is very 
different. In sentence (a), jump functions as a verb and establishes a certain 
relationship—in this case one of jumping—between its arguments. It places these 
arguments in a particular syntactic and semantic relationship with each other. In 
sentence (b), jump functions as a noun within a noun phrase that functions as an 
argument of the verb make. In this case, jump does not extend any structural 
determination past the noun phrase in which it resides, although it is an important 
observation that it does occur within a noun phrase and has certain relationships with 
other elements of that noun phrase. 
 The above examples demonstrate that in the process of determining a lexical 
class, the referent of a word is much less reliable than its distributional characteristics. 
Therefore, when considering the linguistic realizations of personal names, it is useful to 
favor their actual behavior in syntactic environments more than their superficial 
semantic resemblance to other lexical items. This is particularly important when 
considering the relationship of personal names and the lexical class with which they are 
most commonly associated—nouns. 
Some linguists have expressed doubts as to whether names can be distinguished 
from nouns at all (Jespersen 1924: 69; Pulgram 1954: 42), and the lexical class “noun” 
is the first suggestion of Anderson (2007) in his investigation into the matter: 
Does use as a name correlate in any way with membership of a grammatical category, and, if so, 
what is the place of that category in the language system? Is it, for instance, appropriate to regard 
names as a subcategory of noun? (Anderson 2007: 6) 
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There is, however, considerable evidence to suggest that names form a distinct category 
even if their referential function within syntactic constructions is, like nouns, one of 
indicating the argument of a verb. 
Perhaps the most salient syntactic feature of names is the fact that they function 
as complete noun phrases instead of singular words within those phrases. This quality 
has been observed by several linguists (Montague 1973; Anderson 2007), and Pamp 
(1998: 252) uses the term monoreferential lexicalized noun phrase in recognition of the 
fact that names represent an unusual instance of what is apparently a lexical item 
functioning syntactically as a complete noun phrase. This is demonstrated by the 
following examples: 
(c) The boy went down the street. 
(d) George went down the street. 
 
The simplified phrase structures of the above examples are shown in the diagrams 
below: 
Sentence (c) (Fig. 1): 
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Sentence (d) (Fig. 2): 
 
In sentence (d), the name George is seen to occupy an entire noun phrase, whereas boy 
in sentence (c) is a noun which functions as a constituent of a noun phrase. This is a 
significant difference in syntactic behavior which is a defining syntactic feature of a 
name. 
When used as a ‘lexicalized noun phrase’, a phonological realization is 
interpreted as a name, and any name not used as such is not realized as a name in the 
interpretation of the resulting syntactic form. While Anderson uses name to mean 
‘proper noun’, his observations are still apropos: 
The use of George as a non-name is marked syntactically as a conversion or by affixation, as 
with the George I used to know and a Georgian house. Similarly, other categories, or sequences 
of categories, can be converted into names, and this can lead to ambiguity of use. In this case in 
English there is often recourse to capitalization, so the The New Town is a name for an area in 
Edinburgh (whose buildings are no longer very new—which raises another issue), whereas the 
new town is simply a noun phrase. Confronted with the typical cases, in particular, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that there is some kind of difference in syntactic category between name 
and noun, marginal though it may seem to many investigators. (Anderson 2007: 17) 
 
Use of restrictive modification of an apparent name form reflects conversion to noun (§5.4), just 
as the presence of the articles in the above examples of Giering et al. (1980) correlate with 
conversion to or from nouns. Such structures can themselves become names, of course—as with 
Young Fred, who indeed may no longer be young—and there may at this point be no reference 
to Old Fred (dead and/or forgotten). (Anderson 2007: 19) 
 
These indicator of article use points to participation in a noun phrase structure, and may 
be somewhat useful in distinguishing personal names from proper nouns (if such a 
distinction is claimed to exist in the context of syntactic properties). 
While a personal name such as Old George (in this case functioning as a 
personal name) still resists determination imposed by noun phrase structure in syntactic 
environments, similar proper nouns such as the Old Bailey (a particular court in 
London) frequently require such structures (as indicated by the presence of the definite 
article the). Compare the examples below: 
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(e) I saw Queen Mary today. 
(f) I saw the Queen Mary today. 
In sentence (e), Queen Mary is a personal name referring to a particular person (perhaps 
a monarch or a performer of some kind), while in sentence (f), Queen Mary is a proper 
noun referring to a particular ship permanently moored in Long Beach, California. As a 
proper noun, the Queen Mary in sentence (f) is a constituent of a noun phrase, so the 
determiner the appears, as is required by the rules governing the construction of such a 
noun phrase, whereas the Queen Mary in sentence (e) is a personal name which itself 
functions as a noun phrase and therefore appears without phrasal structure. 
 This is not, however, a consistently reliable indicator of a syntactic distinction 
between a personal name and proper noun, as there are several proper nouns that seem 
to behave identically to personal names (i.e. place names such as Boston, Africa, and 
Estonia). So perhaps a reliable distinction cannot be made on the basis of syntactic 
features, but there is at least evidence for some proper noun-like category that is 
syntactically distinct from other linguistic elements. Boundaries between lexical classes 
may sometimes be difficult to discern, but there seems to be sufficient evidence to  
motivate their classification in a distinct category: 
There have been suggestions that names should be assigned to an onomasticon, distinct from the 
lexicon which contains (ordinary) words of all types, and even that names do not belong to 
language at all (Harris 1751; Strawson 1950). They certainly do not seem to be recognized as 
(composed of) instances of ‘the atoms of language’ (Baker 2001). For Recanati (1993) the 
category of names belongs to language, but, in some sense, as we shall see, individual names do 
not. (Anderson 2007: 15) 
 
1.2.2. Semantic Properties of Proper Names 
 
 The semantics of proper names has been an issue for linguists and philosophers 
for thousands of years. Therefore, this section will necessarily be a brief and incomplete 
review of an enormous amount of scholarship impossible to cover completely even in 
many volumes. It will deal largely with analytical philosophy, as there is a multitude of 
scholarly work from this tradition dealing with the semantics of names (mostly due to 
the need for well-defined systems of logic). Its intention is to provide a background to 
the specific semantic properties that differentiate proper names from other linguistic 
signs. Note that here, the term proper name is used, which indicates a particular sign 
which refers directly to its referent without communicating any qualities of that referent. 
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While personal names (as used in this work) are considered proper names, there is no 
apparent useful criteria for distinguishing personal names themselves as unique. 
 There is a danger here of conflating natural language and logical languages 
created for the description and analysis of arguments. Certainly these represent two 
different types of systems with different characteristics. They are, however, closely 
related.  Logical systems are built on natural language and originally served as a means 
for investigating the characteristics of natural language. 
Similarly, natural language is very often analyzed according to principles of 
logical notation. Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the current trend in 
compositional semantics, based on the work of Donald Davidson. It is interesting to 
note that in semantic theories built on Davidsonian principles, names are represented as 
irreducible while other elements of language are often subject to structural dissection 
based on semantic relations with the rest of the utterance. In fact, the simplified and 
strictly rule-governed environment of a logical language can be a useful tool as a sterile 
theater in which certain elements of language can be examined in detail. Names, being 
irreducible, irreplaceable, and therefore essential to both natural language and logical 
language, are a prime candidate for this procedure. 
 John Stuart Mill, who thought that names were not a part of language, identified 
the meaning of a name as lying entirely with its extensional referent (1843). If two 
signforms possessed the same, singular referent, then they were semantically equivalent. 
In this sense, my name indicates nothing about me other than I am a person and my 
name is x. Furthermore, if I also possessed for a name y, then x and y would be 
semantically and logically equivalent. This somewhat echoes Lotman and Uspensky 
when they state: 
The general meaning of the proper name is essentially tautological: a name is not characterized 
by distinctive features, but only designates the object to which the given name is attached […]. 
(Lotman and Uspensky 1978: 213) 
 
However, Mill’s theory was unable to account for many real uses of proper names, and 
as such was insufficient in the context of logical systems. Gottlob Frege, in  Über Sinn 
und Bedeutung (1892), challenged Mill’s theory and proposed that different names 
referring to the same person may have differing semantic structure. While Frege’s 
concept of Bedeutung, or ‘reference’, indicates the referent of a name (or other word), 
Sinn, or ‘sense’, indicates the way in which a name refers to that referent. In doing this, 
it selects certain characteristics of the referent through which the reference is 
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established. This approach (of establishing reference through characteristics of the 
referent) is a descriptivist theory of names, a version of which was also adopted by 
Bertrand Russell (Kripke 1981). 
According to the descriptivist approach, a name finds its proper referent through 
a set of qualities that the referent must possess. This essentially reduces names to 
something of a shortcut for a set of descriptive statements (hence the term 
‘descriptivist’). The proper referent of a name is whoever possesses the qualities 
described. This was the dominant theory of proper name semantics, but presented 
significant logical problems. For example, the theory left little room for the alteration of 
qualities in a referent, and was quite problematic when dealing with hypothetical 
situations. 
The most well-known critic of the descriptivist theory is Saul Kripke, who 
argued in his seminal work Naming and Necessity (1981) that names refer to objects 
regardless of any qualities that the objects themselves might possess. He uses the term 
rigid designator to indicate the special status that these entities have with their referents. 
According to Kripke, names designate rigidly since they reach across different 
circumstances and establish identity without relying on particular qualities of the 
referent. While a desription that picks out a certain entity (one that fits that particular 
description) could pick out any entity that meets that description, a name picks out the 
same entity each time, regardless of the qualities of that entity which may or may not 
match the description under different circumstances. Names, according to Kripke, 
establish transworld identity, so that in any possible world, the identity of a particular 
person is determined solely by their name and not by their qualities in that particular 
world. This is significant in the construction of hypotheticals, a process that 
encountered significant problems under a descriptivist theory. 
Kripke’s theory was a causal one, in which names derived this rigid designation 
through a ‘baptismal’ event at which identity was established, and then a chain of causal 
circumstances within a speech community maintained that identity through time. This 
theory establishes names as a powerful logical force and recognizes that they are very 
strongly referential in a way that may other terms are not. 
 Once again, this unique characteristic of names is a result of their use as such. In 
other words, no matter what particular set of sounds is used to refer to a particular 
entity, it will behave as a name. A word is a name when it is used as such, and at that 
time, it abandons most of its semantic similarities to all other lexical and semantic 
30 
categories. While this may not seem so significant in languages with determined sets of 
words that are heavily used as human vocal names, it is a noteworthy claim in 
languages that reappropriate common nouns for use as names: 
At the opposite extreme, names derived from common nouns in a foreign language and 
nicknames that were once descriptive easily lose whatever sense they originally had. (Aichele 
1997: 72) 
 
Even the designated personal names in languages such as English once had meaning 
beyond simple reference, but they have quickly lost this through their use as names. 
Consider, for example, the English name Alfred. In the Anglo-Saxon language (also 
known as Old English), this name was composed of meaningful elements which, 
together, meant “elf counsel”. In Modern English these elements are no longer 
meaningful. The language has changed and yet the name has not. Since it was used as a 
name, it has lost its association with its original, meaningful elements and remained 
relatively unchanged for more than a thousand years, a period of time during which 
there was massive change in the rest of the lexicon.7 This represents such a radical 
departure from the typical semantic structure of words that the philosopher Paul Ziff 
(1977) declared that names were not a proper part of language at all. 
 
1.2.3. Semiotic Properties of Human Personal Names 
 
 Scholars investigating the essential properties of natural language—especially 
those concerned with the factors differentiating human language from communication 
in nonhuman animals—often use semiotic concepts as tools for outlining such a 
distinction. It is useful, then, to consider personal names in this context, as it would 
elucidate specific characteristics of human vocal personal names that seem to suggest 
that they differ from other linguistic signs in their semiotic structure. 
 It is clear that human vocal personal names are theoretically quite 
conventional—as conventional or arbitrary as any linguistic sign. Of course, there could 
be certain restrictions on the actual form that names take based on various factors such 
as legal requirements, social norms, religious traditions, and naming taboos, to name a 
                                                
7 That is, if names are considered part of the lexicon. 
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few,8 but all elements of language are subject to constraints that are similar, if not 
identical in nature. 
 However, in terms of their referentiality, they seem to not conform to the 
requirements of true symbolicity as outlined by many scholars focused on delimiting 
human language versus nonhuman animal communication. One of the main 
requirements for this property of symbolicity involves the relationships between 
different signs. 
 Consider Sinha’s (2004) account of symbolicity. Here, a true symbol has the 
property of what is termed construal (taken from Langacker 1987), which entails logical 
relationships with other symbols in a sign system. According to Johansson (2005: 224), 
“Construal is a matter of connecting a symbol with other symbols in a network of 
internal relations, not through relations between their respective referents; cf. Saussure 
(1916).” 
Deacon (1997) elaborates the distinction according to similar requirements, and 
his symbol, with regard to its referent, does “not simply to point to it or bring it to mind 
by association” (Deacon 1997: 50). Considering an experiment in which a pigeon was 
trained to communicate the opportunity to obtain food via an arbitrary signal to another 
pigeon, whose cooperation was necessary to actually obtain the food, he states: 
To me, this experiment demonstrates the simplicity and mechanical nature of this form of 
reference. And how its key features—learned associations, arbitrarity, reference, and 
transmission of information from one individual to another—are not sufficient to define 
symbolic reference. (Deacon 1997: 66) 
 
For Deacon, like Sinha, symbols can only occur in symbolic systems in which logical 
relationships between different signs maintain this quality of symbolicity. While 
indexical signs have a relationship of simple reference to objects they indicate, symbols 
exist in relationships with each other. This symbolic relationship is essentially an iconic 
relation between two indices (Deacon 1997: 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 They are also subject to the same phonological constraints as other words (as opposed to their unique 
morphosyntactic properties, perhaps due to the fact that phonological systems seem to be inflexible 
cognitive constraints that even effect perceptual categories). 
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The diagram below, replicated from Deacon, illustrates the emergence of a 
symbolic system (Fig. 3): 
 
(Deacon 1997: 87) 
 
As shown in this diagram, the level of sign development identified as fully symbolic is 
characterized by strong relationships between symbol tokens to which the indexical 
relationships between these symbol tokens and their referents become secondary. In the 
process of the emergence of a fully symbolic system, logical relationships between 
symbol tokens become primary and essential to the maintenance of reference within this 
system. Deacon’s caption of the above diagram indicates that 
Individual indices can stand on their own in isolation, but symbols must be part of a closed 
group of transformations that links them in order to refer, otherwise they revert to indices. 
(Deacon 1997: 87) 
 
This seems to stress participation in grammatical systems is an important indicator of 
symbolicity, one which is apparently more important than any relationship with an 
object of reference. 
Words such as "that," "which," and "what" function to point to other words and phrases, but not 
to specific categories of meanings, and don't evoke mental images. Nevertheless, they produce 
33 
certain expectations about the grammatical structure of what is to follow that we recognize when 
they are violated. Though we hesitate to call these interpretants "meanings" in the same sense as 
for common nouns and verbs, they are functionally equivalent. Finally, consider the complicated 
mixtures of interpretants that are produced in response to whole phrases, sentences, and larger 
narratives or arguments. (Deacon 1997: 64-65) 
 
The resistance of personal names to participate in the internal structure of phrases 
suggests that they are incapable of the full range of internal relations that Deacon uses 
to characterize human language. Certainly they are able to participate to some extent in 
these relations—they do, after all, participate to some extent at the sentence level as 
lexicalized noun phrases—but this participation is somewhat limited. Consider the 
quote above. There is a suggestion that, when considered at the phrasal level, the 
meaning elicited by language already involves “complicated mixtures” of meaning. Yet 
personal names, functionally noun phrases in themselves, have very simple semantic 
structure. 
Personal names so differ from true symbols in their being inherently referential. The inherent 
reference of a personal name is predicated upon its indexical connection to its referent forged in 
an original and performative baptismal act itself replicated in each link of a speech chain which 
introduces the name and its associated referent to an ever wider community of speakers. 
Nevertheless, and despite this indexical dimension, personal names, like true symbols, are 
nomically calibrated. This is reflected in the constancy of their reference across token instances, 
even under reportive calibrations (e.g., even within reported speech constructions). (Fleming 
2011: 149-150) 
 
Furthermore, a personal name is entirely capable of preserving its referential structure in 
the absence of grammatical context. Unlike the verb jump, which was previously 
demonstrated to derive its status as a verb solely from its arguments in a fully formed 
syntactic structure, a name is a name simply by virtue of it being established as such. 
The fact that names non-deictically refer to specific individuals is, of course, a further 
deviation, as the norm is reference to a particular conceptual class, comprising a 
collection of various tokens bearing an iconic resemblance to some prototype (be that 
prototype a concept of a particular object, action, or relation). Names do not refer to any 
category or class relying on iconic relations to determine membership, but rather refer 
to individuals directly and indexically. 
As we can see, then, personal names are a special kind of noun-phrase type, uniting the constant 
denotation of the truly symbolic nouns with the indexical denotation of shifters, anaphoric 
pronouns and demonstratives.” (Fleming 2011: 151) 
 
Therefore, there is good reason to suspect that human vocal personal names are not 
entirely symbolic in the same way that other linguistic elements are. Their resistance to 
grammatical relationships, unique semantic qualities, and capability for constant 
reference regardless of context strongly suggests that their semiotic structure is more 
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closely aligned with Deacon’s category of indexicality than symbolicity—or perhaps 
with some transitional state between the two. 
 Sinha (2004) provides the category protosymbolic as a convenient intermediate 
state. Protosymbolic signs are conventional and arbitrary, display joint reference, but 
are not fully integrated within a system of logical relations. This seems to be an 
appropriate characterization of personal names, and confirms that their place within 
linguistic systems is quite unique. 
This conclusion is not surprising in an evolutionary context, as Deacon (1997: 
45) identifies symbols as a “novel mode of information transmission into the 
evolutionary process”, and in this work I aim to demonstrate that personal names are an 
instance of a signform that is decidedly not novel. As personal names seem to lack the 
properties of fully formed symbols, and symbols are the distinguishing characteristic of 
the communicative and cognitive of humans, the ‘symbolic species’ (Deacon 1997), we 
would expect that there is a possibility of the appearance of personal names in 
nonhuman animal communication. This possibility is explored in the following sections. 
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2. A ZOOSEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
So far, we have dealt only with personal names as they appear within our own 
species, and only in the form with which we seem to have the most contact and 
experience—our vocal names. There is, however, an abundance of evidence to suggest 
that the use of personal names is by no means restricted to humans. As we will see, 
many of these instances of naming behavior in nonhuman animals are very similar to 
human name use, with the caveat, of course, that nonhuman animals are generally 
considered not to have nearly as complex communication systems as natural human 
language. Nevertheless, the use of what should rightly be considered names is painfully 
apparent in several species, and, as this work intends to demonstrate, is most certainly 
present in several more, even if not so apparent to the casual human observer. 
In fact, this work intends to argue that personal naming behavior is essential and 
inextricably linked to certain social organizations, and that these social organizations 
are associated with various other characteristics of these species. Personal naming 
behavior is not simply a novelty found in a random selection of species, but is an 
essential part of social organization in general and a seemingly common semiotic 
activity in certain ecological niches. 
 
2.1. Naming Behavior in Nonhuman Animals 
 
 Communication in nonhuman animals has an enormous variety of forms and 
purposes, many of which can be clearly identified as name use. We must take caution, 
however, in our labeling of certain communicative actions as naming behavior, as they 
may not always adhere to our specific definition of ‘name’. Issues of deixis are 
particularly relevant in this determination, as deictic signforms can easily be mistaken 
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for a more stable referential function. Care must also be taken to restrict the term 
‘name’ to those signforms which retain a singular, stable referent. 
Some forms of nonhuman animal communication are impressively complex, and 
this can often create problems for overzealous researchers willing to attribute certain 
characteristics that may not actually be present. Diana monkeys, for example, have been 
shown to not only indicate a state of alarm, but also the source of that alarm, ‘source’ 
here meaning not the physical location or even method of approach, but the identity of 
the species of the attacker. This determination is stable without dependence on the 
particular approach of the attacker. So if a particular predator is attacking in an unusual 
way, the alarm call will still indicate its identity (Zuberbühler 2000). While this is an 
impressive act of identification, it is in no way a name, as the referent is a general 
category (species) rather than a specific entity (individual). Also, personal naming 
behavior is almost always confined to conspecifics. 
 There are, however, numerous examples of actual naming behavior in various 
nonhuman animal species. Thorpe (1967), cited in Sebeok (1994, 1986), provides 
evidence that certain species of birds participate in personal naming behavior in their 
songs. These birds will perform antiphonal duets with their mating partner, each bird 
having their own tune. The two birds will take turns singing their tunes, combining 
them into a song which serves as an act of social bonding. These individual tunes, by 
virtue of their individuality, already serve as a unique semiotic communication of the 
birds’ individuality, which essentially would serve as a personal name in itself if it is 
interpreted as such. 
The identification of a personal name, however, relies upon a certain sign’s use 
as such within the semiotic discourse of the species. What provides clear evidence that 
these calls function as personal names is the fact that they are used in what is essentially 
name calling behavior. In the absence of its mating partner, a bird will reproduce the 
unique, individual tune of its mate as though calling it by name, which will prompt its 
partner to return (Sebeok 1986, 1994; Thorpe 1967). 
 This is clearly a form of personal naming behavior, as the songs produced serve 
as stable indicators of the individual and are interpreted as such by conspecifics. That 
the tunes differ between individual birds and the apparent awareness of this individual 
reference—demonstrated by the ‘name calling’ behavior of the mate—establishes this 
fact beyond doubt. 
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Examples of name calling behaviors are not limited to these birds, and the use of 
personal names has also been observed in cats, dogs, and primates (Lawick-Goodall 
1968, Rowell 1972, ctd. in Sebeok 1994). Some of the most interesting examples come 
from the behavior of cetaceans. The highly complex clicks, whistles, and songs of these 
highly social mammals have provided countless animal communication researchers with 
very promising data. There has been extensive research into the possible existence of 
what have been termed ‘signature whistles’ in whale species, especially dolphins 
(Backus & Schevill 1966, ctd. in Sebeok 1994; Tyack 1986, Janik & Slater 1998, Janik 
2000, ctd. in McCowan & Reiss 2001; Janik et al. 2006; Tyack 2000). As their name 
implies, these whistles, so it is claimed, function very much like signatures or—in the 
terminology of this work—personal names. Not only are these whistles apparently 
unique to each individual, but they are also exchanged in a manner very similar to the 
antiphonal duets of the birds studied by Thorpe (1967). 
Janik et al. (2006) provides an exhaustive study of the specific dynamics of 
these whistles, and demonstrate that, unusual among instances of animal vocal 
communication, the whistles of dolphins are influenced by what are clearly examples of 
vocal learning. Dolphins are also observed to copy each other’s names in the wild. This 
demonstrates not only the capability for complex vocal learning behaviors, but also the 
awareness of the referentiality of their own signature whistles. The social role of these 
names is also quite clear, and plays a large part in maintaining group cohesion. 
 These very clear examples of naming behavior are instances of what can easily 
be considered communication, but as we examine possible naming behavior in other 
species, there are several issues that make the identification of personal names much 
less clear-cut than the examples above. Even defining communication itself can 
sometimes lead to difficulties. As humans, we tend to judge all communication against 
our own communication, which, given the complexity and uniqueness of human 
language, seems potentially harmful to our understanding of sign use in some 
nonhuman animal species. In the next few sections, I will examine some specific issues 
in terms of nonhuman animal communication and personal naming behavior. 
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2.1.1. Referentiality 
 
 One of the criteria sometimes used to characterize the referential nature of 
animal communication is the ability of the animal to replicate communicative signs in 
the absence of their referent. Morford & Goldin-Meadow (2001) term this displaced 
reference, a term analogous to the detached representation (as opposed to cued 
representation) of Gärdenfors (1996). While all of linguistic communication is 
potentially (and most often actually) an example of this detached representation, the 
same cannot be said for all of nonhuman animal communication. In the examples 
mentioned above, the presence of detached representation should be clear. After all, the 
very existence of name calling behavior requires detached representation in order to 
actually be name calling behavior. There is nothing gained by calling out the name of an 
individual in the presence of the caller. 
 There are, however, examples of what can be considered personal names in 
animals that do not possess displaced reference. 
In addition to acoustic names, it is well known that many birds also have optical names. Oskar 
Heinroth disclosed, as far back as 1938, that ducks, geese, and swans “know each other only by 
face which for us look all the same” (Hediger 1976: 1359). This is true as well for many birds of 
prey, cranes, jackdaws, and others, notably again including the ravens. (Sebeok 1986: 87) 
 
We can assume that these optical or visual names are not used in the context of name 
calling behavior, as they are an inherent quality of the birds’ bodies themselves, and so 
cannot be easily replicated by other birds in order to achieve displaced reference, simply 
due to the fact that birds do not have the ability to rearrange their patterning in order to 
imitate another individual (while their abilities to imitate acoustic signals are quite 
impressive). 
 While these visual names can certainly be considered personal names in that 
they refer to a single, individual organism, and while they may be accompanied by 
acoustic names that may also be used in calling behaviors (Sebeok 1986), there seems to 
be a need for a differentiation between what I will term ‘displaced personal names’ and 
‘nondisplaced personal names’. Displaced personal names are signs of individual 
identity that can be replicated in the absence of their referent. This is the case with the 
acoustic names of the dolphins and birds mentioned above, as well as human vocal 
names. Nondisplaced personal names do not occur in the absence of their referent, and 
yet are still personal names in that they are semiotic indications of an individual 
organism. 
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 One of the potential qualities of a displaced personal name is that it has the 
ability to have a more arbitrary or conventional relationship with its referent. When a 
name can be separated from its referent, its form is less limited by the particular 
physical attributes of that referent. This is often correlated with the particular sensory 
modalities through which the name is conveyed. 
 
 
2.1.2. Intentionality and Modality 
 
 As addressed in the preceding section, some issues of referentiality are closely 
linked with sensory modality. The call names observed in species of birds and dolphins 
are available to be used as such because they are communicated acoustically. 
Other signs that indicate identity could easily come from any number of other 
modalities. It is important to note that the species mentioned above already make 
extensive use of the acoustic channel for other communicative tasks. In dolphins and 
birds, this may simply be a consequence of their environment. Both live in 
environments with the potential for low visibility and operate socially over extended 
areas. In humans, extension of personal naming behaviors into the acoustic realm—
something that has not been observed in other species of apes—is perhaps simply a 
consequence of a certain predisposition for vocal expression effected by our linguistic 
activity. 
This human activity certainly affects our perception of the communicative 
activities of other animals, yet the majority of organisms on this planet do not possess 
an acoustic sense. 
Within their personal phylogenetic constraints, species have chosen and molded sensory channels 
in astonishingly diverse combinations […] Consider butterflies again: like moths, they use sex 
pheromones extensively, but unlike moths, they transmit the pheromones principally by contact or 
through air over distances of no more than a few centimeters. The reason for this curtailment may 
well be that the thermal updrafts and turbulence of the daytime atmosphere preclude the formation 
of long active spaces. Ethologists have had no difficulty making such correlations between 
environment and sensory modes across widely separated phylogenetic groups. Some of the best 
evolutionary reconstructions have traced shifts from one modality to another at the species level 
and are based on enough detail to be fully persuasive. (Wilson 1980: 117) 
 
Since several species can communicate without using the acoustic channel, we could 
expect to find examples of naming behavior that is dependent upon other sensory 
modalities. Some examples of this have already been discussed in the previous section. 
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The nondisplaced names of many species of birds and various other animals are 
manifested in their external physical appearance, which Adolf Portmann (1990) terms 
the semantic organ. 
Animal surfaces represent additional organs or rather organ systems as real as the other organs or 
organ systems such as liver, lungs, pancreas, nervous system etc. This does not mean, however, 
that the properties of the inner anatomical and molecular constitution of an organism have no 
effect on its external display. Semantic organs are visible motifs of animal display that are partially 
dependent on both out (skin, coat) and inner (skeleton, muscles) constitution of a body. As 
Portmann (1960a: 222) has aptly shown, also the colour of inner organ systems such as blood 
vessels and molecular qualities of haemoglobin (redness) may contribute to the external 
appearance of an animal. The organs of visible surfaces are rather co-structured by various 
constituents in the same way as the lungs, for example, are interlaced with nerves, blood vessels, 
integuments etc. (Kleisner & Markoš 2009: 304) 
 
The mere presence of a physical body is often enough to guarantee a constant stream of 
visual information, so many names are unsurprisingly transmitted via a visual channel. 
 Of course, other modalities are also capable of transferring the information 
necessary for naming. Ants perform most, if not all, of their communication through 
chemical signaling, and while the majority of ants seem to lack names entirely, a clear 
exception is the colonial queen. The queen retains her role as queen by constantly 
secreting particular pheromones that are produced by her alone and spread throughout 
the colony as a sign of her health and authority. This ‘queen substance’ is a chemical 
personal name that, while only produced by the queen, is physically displaced 
throughout the colony.  
 Nondisplaced names are very common across different species and different 
modalities. In many species, they are almost constantly broadcast. Even acoustic calls 
have qualities that can serve as nondisplaced personal names. The quality of the 
acoustic signal itself, a consequence of the specific physical arrangement of the vocal 
organs in the individual animal producing the sound, can serve as a nondisplaced name 
(nondisplaced due to the unique nature of that animal’s vocal organs. For example, 
humans easily recognize each other by the sound of their voices and yet are unable to 
accurately replicate the qualities that lead to that recognition (except in the case of 
talented impressionists). 
The literature on vertebrate communication takes it for granted—at least ex hypothesi—that 
indicators (i.e., their own names) are universally incorporated into all messages of birds and 
mammals (Smith 1969a, 1969b)” (Sebeok 1994: 38) 
 
McCowan & Reiss (2001) offer a criticism of the signature whistle hypothesis 
identifying acoustic displaced names in dolphins that is built on the assumption that 
whistle differentiation must depend on variation in frequency patterns. However, the 
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authors state that individual differentiation is, in fact, achieved through other factors of 
acoustic variation in contact whistles.9 While this may challenge the existence of 
displaced personal names in dolphins, it confirms the presence of nondisplaced names 
related to signal quality. 
 An interesting observation related to the difference between displaced and 
nondisplaced personal names is that displaced personal names are more efficient and 
effective in signifying the identity of an individual. Displaced personal names often 
seem to supersede nondisplaced names in that while several nondisplaced names seem 
to co-occur in order to contribute to the process of reference, displaced names in 
themselves encapsulate the entire individual. This occurs, of course, due to their very 
nature as displaced and nondisplaced names. In the presence of an individual, more than 
one nondisplaced name is often available, whereas in the absence of an individual, the 
displaced name must refer to the individual without further semiotic support. 
 Consider the personal names of humans. Clearly, human vocal personal names 
are entirely capable of displaced reference, but are not necessary for the recognition of 
an individual person, which can easily be accomplished through facial recognition, 
voice recognition, behavioral recognition, etc. In the course of typical social interaction, 
all or many of these nondisplaced names will co-occur, and these will all contribute to 
the process of reference. A displaced name, however, will serve as the sole referent of 
an individual, superseding the ‘distributed identity’ communicated by a collection of 
nondisplaced names.10 
 It is interesting to note that while displaced names may have a higher level of 
semiotic complexity, there is empirical evidence that certain nondisplaced names, 
especially the particular appearance of the face, have a much deeper level of cognitive 
support in humans. For example, prosopagnosia is a cognitive deficit associated with 
damage to a particular brain region that prevents facial recognition while having no 
noticeable effect on other cognitive processes. Similarly, Capras syndrome, caused by 
damage to a different area of the brain, prevents appropriate emotional processing 
                                                
9 This, of course, raises the question of exactly how much difference is required before whistles are 
classified as different. The problem is confounded by the fact that, at this point, there is no definitive data 
on what acoustic variation is perceivable by dolphins and what variation then becomes meaningful in 
determining difference. 
10 It is perhaps worthwhile to note that human vocal names are the only proper displaced name in use 
among humans, so that a photograph of an individual is not a sign of that individual, but rather a sign of 
the nondisplaced name of that individual’s physical appearance—in other words, a (primarily iconic) sign 
of a (primarily indexical) sign. 
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associated with faces. Sufferers will believe that those close to them are no longer 
present, but have been replaced with different people who look exactly the same, but are 
not identical. This delusion does not extend to other personal names, so that sufferers 
will have appropriate responses to the sound of someone’s voice, a nondisplaced 
name.11 
 The ability of displaced personal names to so effectively communicate the 
totality of individuality may be indicative of the implied intention and communicational 
awareness that accompanies their use. Certainly name calling behavior require 
awareness of not only the particular referential quality of a displaced name, but also an 
understanding that its use will elicit a certain behavior in the called individual. The fact 
that the process of broadcasting a call or reproducing a displaced name is much more 
energetic than the production of many nondisplaced names implies that the extra energy 
and mental faculty conveys certain benefits to the organisms participating in these 
behaviors. Given these observations, it makes sense to model nondisplaced names as 
primary, as they imply much lower degrees of intentionality and energetic 
communication, and most likely precede displaced names in an evolutionary sense. 
Bradbury & Vehrencamp (2000) have modeled the economic viability of 
communication, demonstrating that it makes sense for intentional communication to 
originate with signals that are already interpreted.  
Comprehension of the signals of others is possible even without there being any communicative 
intent on the part of the sender – very likely our pre-linguistic ancestors were already trying to 
figure out each other’s intentions (Bickerton, 2003). (Johansson 2005: 19) 
 
This may explain the evolutionary progression from nondisplaced, unintentional names 
to displaced, intentional name calling behaviors, which may be one of the most complex 
manipulations of personal names. This should not, however, diminish the importance of 
nondisplaced personal names—or personal names in general—for the social and 
biological characteristics of animal species of all kinds. 
 
2.2. Individual Identity and Social Organization 
 
The use of personal names is inextricably linked to the recognition of individual 
identity. Here I define ‘individual identity’ as the modeling of a particular, singular 
                                                
11 The sufferer will only have an appropriate response if the speaker is out of sight, otherwise the 
inappropriate response to the face interferes. 
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organism as that particular, singular organism, and ‘personal name’ as some semiotic 
representation of an individual (encompassing all forms that representation may take, as 
explored in previous sections). So the recognition of individual identity is simply the 
recognition of an organism as itself—as an individual that is not identical to any other 
individual. 
The recognition of individual identity is entirely dependent upon the 
communication of personal names—in some respect (usually unintentional and 
nondisplaced)—and the communication of personal names is entirely dependent upon 
the recognition of personal identity. The recognition of individual identity is the 
interpretation of a personal name. The processes are entirely identical. We have already 
established that personal names are relatively simple communicative entities. They 
simply refer to one thing—the individual. So in the use of a personal name, the 
recognition of the individual is necessarily implied. 
The following sections will demonstrate that this function (the recognition of 
individual identity) is a fundamental feature of certain social organizations, and in fact 
provides the basis for the division of social systems into two basic categories which are 
closely linked to reproductive strategy—one of the most basic factors in the 
proliferation of life. 
 
2.2.1. Identifiors 
 
 A useful typology for considering the nature of signs of personal identity 
(personal names) is that of identifiors, used by Sebeok (1986, 1994) in his exploration 
of naming in animals, and originating in the work of Charles Morris (1971). Identifiors 
are a class of signs that communicate certain information about the nature of their 
bearers, so they contribute not only to the recognition of individual identity, but to a 
host of other organismal characteristics. 
Every organism conveys certain information about themselves just by virtue of 
their having physical presence in the world. These identifiors can communicate a wide 
range of information to other organisms (both conspecifics and heterospecifics), such as 
sex, age, readiness to reproduce, location, health, etc. 
It is well known that all animals broadcast a steady stream of ‘identifiors,’ that is, displays 
identifying their source in one or more ways: as to its species, reproductive status, location in 
space or in time, rank in a social hierarchy, momentary mood, and the like. (Sebeok 1972: 130, 
qtd. in Sebeok 1986: 83-84) 
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As signs, the physical properties of a particular organism become identifiors 
when they are interpreted by another organism. So the information conveyed by 
identifiors must not only be available to the perceptual capabilities of an interpreting 
organism, but also must be interpretable; that is, they must convey information that is 
meaningful in terms of certain actions that an interpreter might take in relation to the 
organism from which the identifiors originate. 
Considering the information available from identifiors, an organism will react 
appropriately in order to have a particular effect on the bearer of the identifior. For 
example, upon encountering a female conspecific in good health and displaying signs of 
estrus, a male organism may attempt to engage in mating behavior. In order for this 
action to be successful, the male must be aware of the female’s location, the 
performance of any species-specific mating rituals, and various other factors. All of the 
information involved in this interaction is available to the male through identifiors 
originating in the female. 
Identifiors can be classified according to the information that they convey, 
regardless of modality, so that the male organism above might identify the female as a 
conspecific by visual means while recognizing estrus in his potential mate through 
pheromones perceived olfactorily. 
Many identifiors have the effect of characterizing organisms according to certain 
groups or sets to which they belong, which, in practice,  represent a limited number of 
discrete possibilities.12 Some of the most general sets include the set of dead or alive 
organisms and the set corresponding to species. Knowledge of both of these sets may be 
available to heterospecific organisms, and are important considerations in the feeding 
behavior of many predators and scavengers.13 More specific sets include those relating 
to the sex of the animal, specific social castes, or anything that divides a population into 
subsets that determine interactional behavior. 
What we are primarily concerned with here is the communication of individual 
identity, the smallest, most specific set. While other identifiors may contribute to the 
meaningful interpretation of this particular identifior (in much the same way that facial 
recognition, voice recognition, and other nondisplaced name processes contribute to the 
                                                
12 Other identifiors identify their bearers according to more continuous characterizations, such as location, 
health, age, etc. 
13 Identifiors relating to these sets are sometimes manipulated to avoid predation or other purposes. For 
example, an animal might ‘play dead’ or mimic another species more dangerous or poisonous than itself. 
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recognition of human identity), it is this identifior that most significantly determines the 
interactional dynamics of an organism. While nearly all identifiors partly define the 
nature of interaction (such as attempted mating versus attempted eating) where they are 
present, indentifiors that indicate individuality have perhaps some of the greatest effects 
on the basic principles of social organization. 
In Portmannian perspective, an aptitude for mutual understanding sprouts from the very accent 
on selfhood of every living being. The importance of this self-relation is manifested by the vital 
processes of self-construction, self-maintenance, self-identification, and, definitely, self-
representation. Perhaps these features characterize every living being, and just these are lacking 
in inanimate nature. (Kleisner & Markoš 2009: 302) 
 
 
2.2.2. Social Organization and Interindividual Relationships 
 
 The presence or absence of personal names (or the recognition of individual 
identity) is one of the most significant factors determining the nature of social systems. 
This factor is an indication and cause of the organization of social systems into two 
distinct possibilities. Sebeok (1986: 84), based on Wilson (1971: 402) identifies two 
different forms of social systems based on this distinction: personal and impersonal. A 
personal social system is built on the recognition of individual identity, which forms the 
basis of its structure. An impersonal social system is built on the lack of this 
recognition, which similarly determines its structure. 
 Interestingly, the division between personal and impersonal social systems 
seems to loosely correspond with certain biological divisions. In addition to the obvious 
examples of certain species of birds and dolphins mentioned above, many (perhaps all) 
vertebrate species seem to recognize personal identity and exist in personal social 
systems: 
Vertebrates, in contrast, generally have the power of personal recognition. It is probably lacking in 
schooling fishes, in amphibians, and in at least the more solitary reptiles. But personal recognition 
is a widespread and possibly universal phenomenon in the birds and mammals, the two vertebrate 
groups containing the most advanced forms of social organization. (Wilson 1980: 182) 
 
This seems to be a fairly limited phenomenon, however, as “Only a few cases of truly 
personal recognition have been documented in the invertebrates” (Wilson 1980: 182).14 
                                                
14 The two exceptions listed by Wilson are explained as having developed individual recognition in order 
to “cope with specialized ecological requirements” (Wilson 1975: 182) Here again we see that specific 
ecological requirements are a significant force in the development of certain communicative activities (as 
previously suggested as an explanation for the lack of personal names among the Machiguenga as well as 
the deviant linguistic characteristics of Pirahã) 
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 So while personal names are certainly present in some nonhuman animal 
species, they are, in fact, quite rare, and correspond with quite complex social 
organization. This does not mean, however, that impersonal social systems are 
unorganized. Impersonal social systems can reach very high levels of coordination to 
the point where sometimes communities of organisms in such social systems effectively 
function as a single organism. The difference here is that instead of social systems based 
on individual identity, impersonal social systems are built on less specific sets of 
organisms. 
 For example, the impersonal social systems of the colonial insects (such as ants 
and bees) are built on social caste as the most specific recognized categorization. Within 
social castes, there is no differentiation between different individuals: “They can 
recognize castes but not individual nestmates. In a word, the insect society is based 
upon impersonal intimacy.” (Wilson 1980: 179) 
Like individual identity, this social caste of an individual defines the role that 
the particular organism plays in the community as a whole. The only difference is that 
many other organisms occupy this same exact role as well. It is interesting to note that 
in a typical colony structure, the queen can be said to be the sole member of her caste, a 
situation that leads to the only instance of individual recognition within these insect 
societies. Other invertebrates that do not live in organized colonies might recognize sex 
as the most specific organizational category, while those that are hermaphroditic might 
only have specific recognition of species. 
Implicit in the recognition of individual identity in personal social systems is the 
fact that relationships between different organisms can be unique. When an animal has 
the ability distinguish between different conspecifics, the animal has the possibility to 
have a different relationship with each of them.  
 One of the most significant consequences of personal social systems is that they 
allow for the possibility of differing relationships between individual organisms. When 
an individual A can recognize that individual B is distinct from individual C, then 
individual A is endowed with the ability to have a relationship with B that is distinct 
from C. Theoretically, there is no limit to the differently-natured relationships that an 
individual can partake in with other individuals. Alternatively, those animals that do not 
recognize the individual identity of conspecifics will necessarily have the same 
relationship with each other. 
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 Of course, in animal societies organized as impersonal systems, the relationship 
between one individual and every other individual is exactly the same (except when 
specified to some extent by factors such as sex, but even then an individual would have 
only two different relationships with the two different sexes). There is no opportunity to 
develop differing relationships, as there is no way to distinguish any individual with 
which a relationship might differ. 
Many ant colonies, for example, rely on a “worker” class of sterile females to 
carry out many functions within the colony, such as caring for the larvae, gathering 
food, and maintaining the nest. Some ant species have a few different social classes 
carrying out different roles (such as “soldiers”, “workers”, etc.). While the social 
relationships between these different classes necessarily differ, no one individual 
organism occupies any social role alone. There are always other individuals who play 
the same role and have the same relationship with every other individual within the 
colony. 
Of course, the queen is one major exception to this, but only implies a 
unidirectional differentiation. In other words, the queen has an identical relationship 
with every individual in any particular caste, but for every other colony member besides 
the queen, their relationship with the queen is unlike their relationship with every other 
member of the colony. The queen of social insect colonies is the only individual 
organism within those colonies for which individual identity can be said to exist. There 
is only one queen per colony, and she occupies a social role within that colony that is 
occupied by no other individual. 
 The personal social systems discussed above, effected by the recognition of 
individual identity, can be modeled as a weighted network, where links between nodes 
have different values, or ‘weights’. With nodes representing individuals, and the links 
between them modeling their relationships with other individuals, a weighted network is 
created when these relationships are differentiated—a process that only occurs in 
personal social systems. In impersonal societies like those of ants, individuals will not 
have interindividual relationships of different weights, but will have a predetermined 
relationship weight for each social caste. This relationship weight will apply to an entire 
class, with no differentiation between different individuals. 
 Of course, relationships between individuals in personal social systems is much 
more complex than a simple, one-dimensional value system. An organism may have a 
‘potential mate’ relationship with one individual, a ‘parent-child’ relationship with 
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another individual, a ‘competition’ relationship with a third, and a ‘cooperative food 
sharing/offspring rearing’ relationship with a fourth. Even these relationship types are 
too general in many cases. Relationship differentiations can become very complex and 
specific in nature, as is obvious from our own experience. It would be perfectly 
reasonable for my own relationship with another person to consist entirely of meeting 
every other Thursday for lunch at a certain restaurant in order to discuss recent 
developments on our favorite television program.  
 Personal social systems are also characterized by the possibility for flexible 
social dynamics due to the changeable nature of these differentiated interindividual 
relationships. Vincent Janik, a prominent researcher into the signature whistles of 
dolphins, has stated that “group changes are incredibly dynamic, and you need a way of 
knowing exactly who's around you […] Dolphins often prefer to spend time with 
particular individuals.” (Owen 2006) 
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3. EVOLUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1. Evolutionary Dynamics of Individual Recognition 
 
Based on the social factors involved in the development of personal names and 
personal social systems, certain observations can be made about the specific 
evolutionary developments that accompany the emergence of personal names: 
Wilson noted (1971b:402) that “the best organized societies of vertebrates can be distinguished 
by a single trait so overriding in its consequences that the other characteristics seem to flow from 
it.” This pivotal trait is, of course, the recognition of individual identity. (Sebeok 1986: 88) 
 
While this implies a directional evolutionary process from names themselves to other 
animal behaviors, it is perhaps more useful to consider all of these traits as products of a 
process of co-evolution. In other words, while the recognition of individual identity 
mediated through personal names is necessary for many of these behaviors, the 
pressures to develop these behaviors (through processes such as adaptation to certain 
environments with limited resources) may have also led to the development of this 
particular semiotic activity. 
One of the most salient behaviors associated with the recognition of individual 
identity is territoriality, wherein an organism establishes a particular area as its own, an 
activity that guarantees the organism access to all of the resources in that area without 
competition. In order to maintain a territory, an animal must project its claim through 
semiotic means. The animal must therefore be able to distinguish between signs of itself 
and signs of other individuals. 
While this is not equivalent to individual recognition, it is a significant step 
towards the more complex social structure in that it indicates a certain degree of social 
agency—that is, the ability of an individual to actively participate in social interactions. 
However, observed territorial behavior involves more than just social agency. Since the 
extent of an animal’s territory necessarily relies upon the extent of the neighboring 
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territory of conspecifics (usually of the same sex), recognition and differentiation of its 
neighbors are essential (Sebeok 1986: 88). Many specific examples demonstrate this 
need: 
Among species of the higher vertebrates it is commonplace for individuals to be able to 
distinguish one another by the particular way they deliver signals. Indigo buntings, American 
robins, and certain other songbirds learn to discriminate the territorial calls of their neighbors 
from those of strangers that occupy territories farther away. When a recording of a song of a 
neighbor is played near them, they show no unusual reaction, but a recording of a stranger's song 
elicits an agitated aggressive response. (Wilson 1980: 102) 
 
Here, birds recognize their individual neighbors and so expect to encounter their 
neighbors’ song-names. When the bird hears a song-name that it does not recognize as 
originating from one of its territorial neighbors, it perceives that its territory is being 
threatened by some transient and reacts in order to defend it. The bird is clearly making 
use of personal names as markers of the individual identity of its territorial neighbors in 
order to judge the need to maintain or defend its own territory. 
Wilson observes a similar pattern in male wildebeests, which perform a 
challenge ritual each day to affirm their territorial claim. 
The apparent function of the challenge ritual is to reaffirm the male's property rights while 
testing those of his neighbors. The territorial owner seems to recognize his neighbors personally, 
and the exchanges are marked by what can be reasonably called mutual restraint. (Wilson 1980: 
235) 
 
Territoriality itself is basically a claim of certain resources aiding in either personal 
survival (e.g. food) or genetic survival (e.g. potential mates). The need for various 
resources to be claimed in such a way suggests that the total available resources are 
limited. In the case of energetic and nutritional resources, this may be a consequence of 
the particular ecological niche occupied by the species. The competition for these 
resources ensures that the genetic material of those who are better able to compete is 
replicated. 
The preservation of resources is not limited to solitary animals, and another 
example of animal behavior that seems to be heavily rely on an individual’s ability to 
recognize individuality is long-term mating behavior, or really any mating behavior that 
involves two mating organisms being in reproductive association that extends beyond a 
single sexual event when other sexual partners are available. 
When more than one potential sexual partner is present, an individual engaged in 
a long-term mating association must differentiate between its mating partner and other 
conspecifics with which it has a non-mating relationship. 
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This particular reproductive strategy often involves the sharing of resources and 
resource-gathering activities between paired individuals, and so, like territoriality, may 
also be driven by the need to secure resources that would otherwise be scarce. 
Mating pairs will also typically participate in cooperative rearing of offspring, 
an activity typically requiring a division of tasks, often necessitating the physical 
separation of the pair, sometimes for extended periods of time. If a mating pair is not 
able to recognize each other, there is no way to maintain the association. 
 The very action of rearing offspring is often necessitated by the existence of 
complex personal social systems, as animals that have these complex systems often 
require extended periods of social bonding. Many species that do not recognize 
individual identity require much less time in close contact with caretakers. Their genetic 
makeup is usually sufficient for their effective survival. This is not the case in species 
that form social systems wherein interindividual relationships are differentiated and 
dynamic. 
This is partly due to the simple fact that there is simply too much potential social 
information relating to too many potential social actors to be accounted for in the 
genetic code. In a complex personal social system, the flexibility of the social system 
makes any hard-wired sociality next to impossible. While most, if not all, of the social 
interactions in species like ants are genetically determined, animals in dynamic social 
systems must learn how to function properly in a social environment. Organisms must 
then rely on extended periods of social bonding and, in some species, stable social 
constructs preserved by cultural transmission. 
A natural consequence of this need for increased socialization is the extension of 
maturation time, necessitating a greater investment of energy in offspring, which, in 
turn, leads to a greater valuation of that individual as an individual. If an organism 
invests large amounts of energy into the rearing of its offspring, it will be much more 
invested in the survival and success of that offspring. 
In turn, this supports the mechanisms through which individual recognition is 
possible. A greater valuation of a particular individual means that it makes much more 
sense to maintain a personal relationship with that individual to ensure survival and 
success. The recognition of individual identity and the investment of larger amounts of 
energy into the rearing of offspring are two patterns that support each other, and good 
could very well be explained by a process of co-evolution. 
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An interesting connection can be drawn here to r/K selection theory, which 
groups species by their survival strategies (MacArthur and Wilson 1967; Pianka 1970). 
K-selected species tend to have a larger body size, invest more energy into raising 
offspring, have fewer offspring with a long period of maturation, have a longer life 
expectancy, and display a higher individual intelligence. The opposite traits are found in 
r-selected species, which tend to reproduce quickly, cheaply, and in great numbers.  
The principle of r/K selection is based on an equation of population dynamics in 
which the r variable represents the maximum growth rate of the population and the K 
variable represents the carrying capacity of the environment. There is a necessarily 
limited amount of resources in any ecological niche, which limits the maximum growth 
rate of any population. However, the amount of resources available in some ecological 
niches is much more limited than in others (in relation to what is required to maintain 
the current population), so the competition for those resources is much greater. So K-
selected species, facing greater competition, have evolved to be better individual 
competitors, while r-selected species have evolved to reproduce as quickly as possible 
in order to take advantage of the available resources. 
In the r-selected species, it makes no sense to invest a large amount of energy in 
the raising of offspring. The capacity to reproduce so quickly means that the success of 
the individual is much less important. 
Interestingly, in social insect colonies, the queen shows some characteristics of 
K-selected animal species, such as a larger body size and increased longevity. They also 
seem to be more adaptable in regards to the role they play within the colony. Certainly 
for most of their lives queens do little more than lay eggs, but often they must, at some 
point, perform the tasks of other social classes. This is particularly relevant to the 
beginning of a queen’s life, when she may be expected to fight other ants (especially 
other queens), excavate the beginnings of a nest, find food, and rear the first generation 
of workers. 
The ability to operate in complex, dynamic social systems implies the possession 
of the cognitive capability to manage those relationships. So far, I have discussed 
differentiated relationships as though the recognition of individual identity guaranteed 
the ability to engage in social organizations that are potentially infinitely complex. This, 
however, is not the case. In order to maintain a relationship of any type with another 
individual, an organism must be able to conceptualize and remember that relationship. It 
is not surprising, then, that K-selected species typically have higher levels of individual 
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intelligence. Even higher cognitive function is necessary to process the interindividual 
relationships between other individuals within the social group: 
Vertebrates are also capable of quick forms of learning that fit them to the rapidly changing nexus 
of relationships within which they live. When an ant colony faces an emergency, its members need 
only respond to alarm pheromones and assess the general stimuli they encounter. But a rhesus 
monkey must judge whether the excitement is created by an internal fight, and if it is, learn who is 
involved, remember its own past relation to the participants, and judge its immediate actions 
according to whether it will personally benefit or lose by taking action of its own. (Wilson 1980: 
182) 
 
Personal social systems lead to higher cognitive functions and extended social bonding. 
Interestingly, they seem to correlate with animal behaviors associated with emotional 
attachment. These characteristics alone are so pervasive in our own species that the 
importance of individual identity is painfully evident. It is the cornerstone on which our 
very humanity is built, and is without question one of the most pervasive and influential 
characteristics of animal behavior. It is no surprise, then, that many scholars point to the 
ability to operate within these complex social systems as a significant factor in the 
evolution of human language. 
 
3.2. Names as Preceding and Necessary to Language 
 
 The origins of language have been a favorite topic of speculation for at least 
thousands of years. Language use is, after all, a uniquely human behavior. It is so 
unique that scientific inquiry into the matter is very complicated and unclear. Even 
armed with modern scientific findings, definite answers are hard to come by. There are, 
however, some things we can say about language evolution based on certain patterns 
that seem to pervade the biological world as well as more useful tools to aid in analysis 
of language use itself. 
There is much we still do not know about the origin of language, and much that we may never 
know. It is an issue of enormous complexity. But the field is not totally devoid of relevant data, 
and it is not open to unbridled speculation once all pertinent data are taken into account – the 
dictum of the Linguistic Society of Paris from 1866 is no longer motivated. (Johansson 2005: 
246) 
 
It is in this spirit that the analysis of the nature of personal names can provide some 
useful answers to some of the questions related to this difficult endeavor. 
 Currently, most research into language evolution deals with the development of 
the cognitive abilities to process language—also called the ‘language faculty’. Here we 
find a significant amount of theorists who rely upon the pre-existence of personal names 
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and the personal social systems they create in order to account for this powerful 
evolutionary development. 
 As mentioned in previous sections, the weighted social networks found in 
personal social systems are much more complex and dynamic than the social networks 
found in impersonal social systems as found in colonial insect species. Maintaining a 
complex, dynamic social system requires certain abilities allowing for the manipulation 
of information within individuals and the transfer of information between individuals. It 
is only possible among species with higher individual intelligence and the ability to 
transfer a large amount of social information within the network.  
The solution to the dilemma lies in the evolution of social intelligence, starting with the 
recognition of other individuals, remembering past interactions with each individual, and 
differentiation of behavior towards other individuals depending on their past behavior. But in a 
large group, this taxes the brain power of most animals, limiting either the group size or the 
complexity of the social system (Dunbar, 1993). (Johansson 2005: 210) 
 
A static status hierarchy is a common solution with limited cognitive demands—but the 
complexity rises fast if the status hierarchy isn’t static, and if status relations aren’t transitive. 
(Johansson 2005: 210) 
 
Animals living in impersonal social systems have no need for extensive 
cognitive abilities to maintain order since their social hierarchy is static. Since social 
relations within these societies are completely inflexible, they are able to reach very 
large sizes and may consist of thousands of individuals without taxing the cognitive 
abilities of the individuals. In fact, since these societies are organized purely by castes, 
the addition of an individual in any caste in no way taxes the social intelligence of any 
other individual, allowing for theoretically unlimited growth (as far as social limits are 
concerned). The exception to this, as we have seen, is the queen, which, as the sole 
carrier of individual identity within the social insect colony, often cannot coexist with 
another queen15. 
 We humans and our closest biological relatives operate in a much more complex 
social system, and the cognitive demands of this complex system are often cited as a 
major contributing factor in the evolution of some of more complex social functions. In 
fact, it is this need to participate in complex social environments and navigate complex 
political situations in order to guarantee our survival that may have been a primary force 
in our cognitive evolution (Joffe 1997). 
                                                
15 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but for the most part colonies rely on a single queen as the 
sole carrier of individual identity. Situations deviating from this norm are often unstable and seem to be 
the only source of conflict within colonies. 
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 As language is often considered to be the apex of human cognitive abilities, it is 
no surprise that many scholars have proffered these social pressures as the primary 
mechanism behind the evolution of linguistic systems.16 The linguist Stephen Pinker, 
himself a proponent of an innate universal grammar, has commented that such complex 
cognitive mechanisms are hardly needed to guarantee survival in the face of natural 
threats, but would serve quite useful in the political struggle against other humans 
(Pinker 1994). 
 While complex cognitive functions may be associated with a higher level of 
social interaction, there is also evidence to suggest that language learning and language 
processing depend on these same functions. The first indications of a connection 
between social learning and language learning come from the many attempts to teach 
human language (or some semblance thereof) to nonhuman animals. The subjects in 
these experiments have been of a variety of species to which a high level of intelligence 
is typically ascribed, including parrots, dolphins, and other apes. 
It is interesting to note that all of these species are highly social and display 
complex group dynamics (Johansson 2005). This alone hints at some connection 
between complex social functions and language learning, but the evidence extends 
beyond this simple correlation. Not only do highly social species outperform others in 
their language learning abilities, but they also outperform conspecifics when the 
language learning occurs in a social setting (Johansson 2005). So not only is social 
interaction important for the development of the appropriate cognitive capacities, but 
also for the act of learning itself. This is perhaps not so surprising given the fact that 
language is in itself an entirely social phenomenon. 
Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to posit that the evolutionary development of 
complex social interactions is a prerequisite for the evolutionary development of 
linguistic systems. More specifically, the highly complex nature of these social systems 
may be quite implicitly involved in establishing the particular evolutionary pressures 
that would encourage the development of such a complex system of communication. 
                                                
16 In this context, the concept of ‘language’ most accurately refers to systems of syntactic and symbolic 
processing. While language in its current form clearly relies on much more than just the ability to 
manipulate complex syntactic structures, this is often considered to be the most difficult task in terms of 
cognitive demands and has often been the only factor in differentiating language from other behaviors 
seen in non-human animals. It is therefore the main object of research for most investigations of language 
evolution. 
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 In order to maintain these complex social systems, an enormous amount of 
information must be transferred between individuals and held in the memory of 
individuals in order to ensure that the individual can successfully function in a social 
system full of potential missteps and pitfalls that could significantly damage the status 
of the individual within the group, threatening survival. Johansson (2005: 126) claims 
that the development of systems that successfully transmit information may help gain 
status within the social group (which, he notes, is only possible if the social dynamic is 
changeable, implying a weighted social network). 
Many scholars have proposed certain cognitive prerequisites for the cognitive 
processing of fully formed language and the symbolic thought that is intricately 
involved in its manifestation. Among these proposals are the need for a certain level of 
self-awareness and intentionality (Sinha 2004). Several scholars have used the term 
embodiment (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Zlatev 1997) to describe the particular cognitive 
state necessary for linguistic thought, which Johansson describes as 
a suitable biological development program, an appropriate sociocultural environment, and the 
ability to have a place in and be an active agent in this environment (Johansson 2005: 227) 
 
Many, if not all, of these requirements assume the existence of a personal social system, 
a basic parameter of social organization upon which all higher organizational systems 
are necessarily built. 
 While language might indeed depend upon highly complex—and therefore 
necessarily personal—social systems, humans are not unique in this particular social 
organization, as has been demonstrated extensively in earlier sections of this work. 
These facts logically lead to the question of why linguistic ability seems to be confined 
to one species out of many that operate within similarly complex social structures. 
The social systems of humans have sometimes been identified as some of the 
most complex social systems: “we are more deeply social than any other species on 
earth in our cognitive makeup” (Whiten 2000: 477, emphasis in original, qtd. in 
Johansson 2005: 208). Other scholars similarly claim that the organization of human 
social groups is much more complex than that found in the social groups of other 
animals (Leigh 2001). 
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 High levels of social intelligence are not enough, however, to account for the 
nature of linguistic systems themselves, which rely on complex structures of meaning 
and syntax that interact in highly complex ways. There are some who point to personal 
names and the actual structure of personal social systems as significant in shaping the 
mind into a language machine. 
 Aiello (1998: 29), for example, finds similarities in the types of cognitive 
processes required for all levels of language processing (components determining the  
semantic characteristics as well as syntactic structures) and the cognitive processes 
active in complex social interactions. This suggests that cognitive structures responsible 
for language were co-opted in the course of language development. 
 Deacon (1997: 204-205) also proposes that specific social situations—
specifically the need to maintain stable mating relationships within larger social 
groups—provided the evolutionary pressures that led to the development of the 
language faculty. 
 One useful observation originates with the structure of names themselves. As 
human vocal names seem to have share some characteristics with other linguistic 
elements (such as their ability to refer to an object in the absence of that object), they 
also differ significantly in some other elements (such as their participation in phrasal 
structures and their semiotic characteristics). The nature of this relationship suggests 
that names are perhaps a more simple form of words, and some researchers claim that 
their structure served as a basis or template for other language features: 
Names are the basic entity-category, minimally subclassified and endowed with the capacity for 
primary identification via onymic reference; and they are the basis for the structure and 
development of other categories—including, most directly, of pronouns and nouns. But their 
centrality is also attested to by their essential presence in the implementation of grammar in the 
form of referential utterances that do not have to depend on indefinitely recursive descriptions 
[…]. Names are obviously not sufficient to make a linguistic system, but they are necessary: 
name-free full linguistic communication is not an option. (Anderson, 2007: 332-3) 
 
But if names are something of a proto-linguistic sign, then how are they able to function 
in relation to linguistic systems at all? 
Jackendoff (cited by Botha (1999)) instead resolves the paradox by arguing that language isn’t 
perfect, that it does have the patchwork character typical of evolved systems. Marcus (2004c) 
takes this argument one step further, identifying patchwork candidates in our language capacity, 
‘fossils’ of its evolutionary history.” (Johansson 2005: 166) 
 
The evolutionary history of any complex system, such as human cognition or the human 
language capacity, necessarily starts with something simpler. That is not to deny that evolution 
can sometimes simplify. But the dominant evolutionary trend is from simple to complex, and the 
original protosystems were undoubtedly simple. It is accepted as a working hypothesis that a 
precursor of the modern human language capacity for complex syntactic language was a capacity 
for protolanguage […], a kind of communication system with no syntax. In protolanguage, 
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although words may have been uttered in short sequences, there were no rules defining the 
wellformedness of strings, and therefore words in protolanguage could not be said to belong to 
separate syntactic classes, such as Noun or Verb. (Hurford 2001: 119) 
 
Similarly, Bates states that “[l]anguage is a new machine that Nature built out of old 
parts.” (Bates 2003: 263, qtd. in Johansson 2005) Based on their limited participation in 
various linguistic systems, their unique semiotic nature, and their close involvement in 
creating the social situations which seem to be essential to language evolution, it seems 
that a safe claim would be that names are essential to linguistic systems and necessarily 
precede them. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This work presents an account of personal names in the context of various 
semiotic systems, and reaches several conclusions based on an analysis of their behavior 
in such systems. Their nature as signs that directly and non-deictically refer to singular 
individuals while conveying very little other information places them in a unique 
position in these various semiotic systems. 
It has demonstrated that human vocal names have been shown to have a very 
different referential structure than most linguistic signs. Personal names also do not 
conform to typical syntactic determination, occupying the role of an entire phrase 
instead of participating in any phrasal structure. Personal names are unique in their 
semantic structure, being irreducible and having direct reference that supersedes 
context. 
Based on this data, a conclusion is made that the semiotic nature of personal 
names is not primarily symbolic, but essentially indexical, displaying characteristics 
more typical of nonhuman animal communication than natural language. 
Based on this determination, this work investigated the presence of names in 
animal communication, and found them to be present (sometimes in a form almost 
indistinguishable from human name use). The presence of names was indicative of 
certain social arrangements that influence the evolution of language. 
Therefore, I conclude that personal names are semiotic interlopers partially 
integrated within linguistic systems and yet not fully belonging nor participating. At the 
same time, they create social situations that seem to directly influence the evolutionary 
development of language while also possibly serving as a model for other linguistic 
elements. 
By this account, human vocal names are a linguistic (or perhaps semi-linguistic) 
expression of a much simpler and older signform that still retains much of its indexical 
nature.
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
 
Personaalsed nimed kui prelingvistilised märgid 
Summary 
 
Käesolev töö käsitleb personaalseid nimesid erinevatest vaatenurkadest, et 
määratleda nende seost naturaalse keele ja selle evolutsioonilise päritoluga. Siinkohal 
on personaalne nimi defineeritud mitte-deiktilise märgina, mis viitab üksikule 
individuaalsele organismile. Selle definitsiooni järgselt ei ole personaalsete nimede 
kasutamine piiritletud inimestega. Sellest tulenevalt on kasutatud andmeid nii inimeste 
kui ka loomsetest semiootilistest süsteemidest.   
Järgnevalt on vaadeldud personaalsete nimede käitumist inimeste semiootilistes 
süsteemides – nii kultuurilistes kui ka lingvistilistes. On näidatud, et personaalsed 
nimed omavad mitmeid unikaalseid omadusi, mis eristavad neid teistest märkidest. 
Arvesse on võetud personaalsete nimede andmise kalduvus loomade seas ja käsitletud 
mitmeid probleeme. Personaalsed nimed on loomade käitumises laialt levinud, neid 
seostatakse sotsiaalse organiseerumise põhiliste omadustega.  
Viimaks on uuritud andmetes esinevaid viiteid arengulistele iseärasustele, 
pöörates tähelepanu inimkeele evolutsioonilisele päritolule. Autor järeldab, et 
personaalsed nimed on tunduvalt lihtsamad ja vanemad kui ülejäänud lingvistilised 
märgid, mis eelnevad keele arengule.  
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